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mandate,' has reported its recommendations for the first com-
prehensive revision of the bankruptcy laws since the Chandler Act
of 1938.2 This Article deals with the proposed revision of the
provisions relating to priority and dischargeability of tax claims in
cases under the Bankruptcy Act. 3
I
PRIORITY OF TAX LIENS AND CLAIMS
The Commission proposed major changes in the priority status
of tax liens and claims in bankruptcy. Under the proposed act,
statutory liens for taxes, other than ad valorem property taxes and
special assessments, are no longer recognized as against the
trustee.4 Income taxes and employment taxes, other than taxes
withheld from wages, for periods before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition rank only as general claims unless the due date of
the tax return falls after or within one year preceding the petition
date, regardless of whether the debtor makes a legitimate or
fraudulent return.5 Older taxes for which an extension of time for
payment had been granted retain their priority except as to pay-
ments more than one year in arrears. 6 Employment taxes imposed
on the debtor with respect to wages earned before but paid after
filing the petition are deemed prebankruptcy taxes for priority
purposes, but amounts required to be withheld from such wages
share the priority status of those wages. 7 The amount available for
tax claims is further reduced by liberalization of the superior
priority for wages and by addition of a new priority for pension
plans and similar contributions.8 Federal nontax claims do not
enjoy any priority in bankruptcy under the new proposal. Penalties
and postbankruptcy interest are no longer disallowed, but are
I S.J. Res. of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
2 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
Bankruptcy Act §§ 17a, 64a, 11 U.S.C. §§ 35(a), 104(a) (1970).
COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT, PART II
(PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT), H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 4-606 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT]. The proposed legislation has been
introduced in Congress as H.R. 10792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
5 This is true regardless of whether assessment of a tax deficiency was restrained at the
time.
6 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(5). Priorities of other forms of taxes would be
even further restricted, as detailed hereafter.
7 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(c).
8 Id. §§ 4-405(a)(3), (4).
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subordinated to general claims.9 These rules of priority also apply
in reorganization cases; the present principle of absolute federal
priority is discarded.10
A. Statutory Liens for Taxes
1. Current Law
Although the Constitution empowers Congress to "establish
... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States,"" the regulation of insolvencies was left, during
most of the nineteenth century, to the states, subject only to
congressional insistence that "the debts due to the United States
shall be first satsified."' 2 Nevertheless, during that century three
depression-born but short-lived federal bankruptcy acts were
adopted.' 3 The first of these, enacted in 1800 and repealed in
1803, decreed that, subject only to the overriding federal priority, 4
all creditors should be paid proportionately, irrespective of any
security they might have "by judgment, statute, recognizance, or
speciality."' 5 All subsequent federal bankruptcy legislation, how-
ever, from the abortive acts of 184116 and 186717 to the permanent
system established in 1898, has "traditionally recognized that a lien
is a valid property right which must be satisfied out of the assets to
which it attaches before any part of those assets becomes available
for distribution to unsecured creditors,"'18 subject only to excep-
9 Id. §§ 4-405(a)(8), (9).
1o Id. § 7-303(2).
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
12 REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970) (originating in substantially its
present form in Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515).
3 See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 581-82 (1935). See
generally C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935).
'4 Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 62, 2 Stat. 36, repealed, Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2
Stat. 248.
" Id. § 31, 2 Stat. 30. See also id. § 62, 2 Stat. 36.
16 Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 442 (repealed 1843) (construed in Peck v.
Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612 (1849)).
17 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, §§ 14, 20, 14 Stat. 522-26 (repealed 1878) (construed
in Yeatman v. New Orleans Say. Institution, 95 U.S. 764, 766 (1878); Doe v. Childress, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 642 (1875)).
"I S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT],
quoting H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT]; accord, Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 135 (1962) ("[p]roperty
interests in a fund not owned by a bankrupt at the time of adjudication, whether complete
or partial, legal or equitable, mortgages, liens, or simp!e priority of rights are ... not a part
of the bankrupt's property and do not vest in the trustee"). See also Oppenheimer v.
Oldham, 178 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1969).
1974]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tions designed: (1) to exclude preferential -and fraudulent trans-
actions' 9 and disguised rules of priority,20 and (2) to place the
trustee in at least as favorable a position as an execution creditor. 21
Although none of the acts before 1938 referred expressly to
statntory liens, as distinguished from those arising by agreement or
obtained by judicial acts or proceedings, it was well established that,
if duly perfected and not otherwise invalidated, statutory liens
shared in the recognition which the acts gave generally to "liens. 22
The Chandler Act of 1938 made it explicit not only that "statutory
liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, landlords, or
other classes of persons, and statutory liens for taxes and debts
owing to the United States or any State or subdivision thereof"
were valid in bankruptcy, but also that they could not be voidable
as preferences "even though arising or perfected while the debtor
is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the
petition." Such a lien arising before bankruptcy might be perfected
thereafter, within the time permitted by applicable law.23 That
congressional action, coupled with the Act's deletion of the former
blanket recognition of any priority provided by state law,24 trig-
gered a movement to convert state law priorities into statutory
liens, thus defeating the congressional purpose to make priorities
in bankruptcy "uniform . . . throughout the United States. 25
Concluding that "[l]iens on personal property unaccompanied by
possession .. are of the nature of 'floating liens,' which attach to
all a debtor's personalty, although the property he owns is com-
19 Fraudulent and preferential liens were dealt with in the Act of Aug. 19, 1841 (ch. 9,
§ 2, 5 Stat. 442), the first act that recognized liens at all. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67a, 11
U.S.C. §§ 96, 107(a) (1970).
20 See notes 30-35 and accompanying text infra.
21 The Act of July 1, 1898 (ch. 541, § 67a, 30 Stat. 564), first imposed the express
condition that "[cilaims which for want of record or for other reasons would not have been
valid liens as against the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt shall not be liens against his
estate." That provision was fortified by the Act of June 25, 1910 (ch. 412, § 8, 36 Stat. 840),
giving the trustee, in effect, the rights that a creditor holding an execution or other lien by
legal or equitable proceedings would have. See United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266, 271-72
(1965): Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
22 Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174 (1919); Henderson v. Mayer,-225 U.S. 631 (1912);
In re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1939); In re Brannon, 62 F.2d 959
(5th Cir. 1933).
22 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575 § 67b, 52 Stat. 876-77.
24 Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 15, 44 Stat. 666-67. The incorporation of state law
priorities had originated in the Act of March 2, 1867 (ch. 176, § 28, 14 Stat. 531).
25 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Supreme Court, with reference to the earlier laws,
had declared that constitutional uniformity was not lacking "when the trustee takes in each
State whatever would have been available to the creditors if the bankrupt law had not been
passed." Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).
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monly changing from day to day, '2 6 Congress, in 1952, declared
invalid against the trustee "statutory liens created or recognized by
the laws of any State for debts owing to any person, including any
State or any subdivision thereof, on personal property not accom-
panied by possession of, or by levy upon or by sequestration or
distraint of, such property," unless such liens had been enforced by
sale before the filing of the petition.17 Certain nonpossessory and
unenforced statutory liens on personal property, nevertheless,
were not invalidated but continued to be postponed in payment to
the two nost favored priority classes-administration expenses and
wages. 28 Among the statutory liens which were merely postponed
but not invalidated were those created by federal law, including
"liens for taxes and debts owing to the United States." Despite
some ambiguity resulting from an overlap in the terms of the
invalidation and postponement provisions, liens for taxes owing to
states and their subdivisions were held to be subject merely to
postponement. 29
In 1966, Congress reexamined the problem of overcoming
"the distortion of the Federal Order of distribution by the creation
of spurious statutory liens," and concluded that "neither the stan-
dard of possession nor the distinction between real and personal
property is an entirely satisfactory criterion," since "[s]ome lines
[sic] which are genuine property rights are affected and others
which were essentially State-created priorities escape."30 Therefore,
"[t]o insure the supremacy of the order of distribution provided in
the Bankruptcy Act insofar as it is consistent with the continued
recognition of genuine lien interests,"31 the 1966 legislation 32 in-
validated in bankruptcy: (1) every statutory lien, whether on real or
personal property, "which first becomes effective upon the insol-
26 H. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952). See also S. REP. No. 1395, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952).
27 Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 21, 66 Stat. 428 (amending Bankruptcy Act § 67c).
28 Id. In order to minimize the consumption in satisfaction of liens of funds needed for
those most favored priorities, wage claims of limited amount having been elevated above
federal nontax debts in 1898 and over unsecured tax claims in 1926, the Chandler Act had
postponed to such priorities the satisfaction of all nonpossessory and unenforced statutory
liens on personalty, including those which Congress in 1952 determined wholly to invalidate.
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 67c, 52 Stat. 876-77.
2'9 Rochelle v. Dallas, 264 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959); In re
Baron, 165 F. Supp. 186 (D. Conn. 1958). See In re Century Vault Co., 416 F.2d 1035, 1038
(3d Cir. 1969).
30 SENATE REPORT 6, quoting HousE REPORT 5.
31 Id.
32 Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, § 4; 80 Stat. 268, amending Bankruptcy Act
§ 67c(1), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1) (1964) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1) (1970)).
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vency of the debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation of his
property, or upon execution against his property levied at the
instance of one other than the lienor," such a "lien" being viewed
as merely determining the order of distribution rather than repre-
senting "a specific property right which may be asserted indepen-
dently of a general distribution and regardless of the transfer of
the property"; 33 and (2) every statutory lien on real or personal
property which is not perfected at the date of bankruptcy against
one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser 34 on that date,
such a lien being viewed as "so tenuous" that the "holders of such
liens have reason to know that their security is extremely
vulnerable." 35 The invalidation of the second category of liens was
qualified, however, by a proviso: if a statutory lien is sufficiently
perfected at the date of bankruptcy to prevail over a judicial lien
creditor, 36 but further action is still required to perfect the lien
against a "subsequent" bona fide purchaser, the lien is nevertheless
valid against the trustee even if the latter action is taken after
bankruptcy but within the time permitted by the lien statute.
Notice to the bankruptcy court was substituted for seizure if the
latter was the prescribed perfecting action. 37
The proviso contains two ambiguities. One results from the
failure of the statute to establish a time reference for the word
"subsequent." Leading bankruptcy commentators have construed it
to mean that postbankruptcy action which perfects the lien against
persons purchasing subsequent to such perfection is sufficient. Profes-
sor King concluded that the effect thereof on bankruptcy ad-
ministration "could become chaotic" in cases where applicable lien
law sets no time limit on such perfection; 3 and Professor Marsh
"3 SENATE REPORT 6-7, quoting HOUSE REPORT 5-6.
'4 The term "bona fide purchaser" is defined to "include a bona-fide encumbrancer or
pledgee and the transferee, immediate or mediate, of any of them." Bankruptcy Act, § 1(5),
11 U.S.C. § 1(5) (1970).
3" SENATE REPORT 7, quoting HOUSE REPORT 6. In addition, certain liens for rent, with
which we are not here concerned, were invalidated as liens but recognized as junior
priorities, next above general creditors. Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(C), 11 U.S.C. §
107(c)(1)(C) (1970).
", The reference is to. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970). The trustee
receives the rights of "a creditor who obtained a judgment against the bankrupt upon the
date of bankruptcy," as well as of "a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained an
execution returned unsatisfied against the bankrupt" and of one "who upon the date of
bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings. ... Id.
" Id. § 67c(1)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B) (1970).
3" King, Statutory Liens Under New § 6 7 c of the Bankruptcy Act, 42 REF. J. 11, 14 (1968).
Professor King has suggested that the bankruptcy court utilize bar orders, under its general
equitable powers, to cut short the time for perfection in such cases. King, Post-Bankruptcy
Perfection of Statutory Liens, 72 CoN. L.J. 346 (1967).
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stated that the proviso makes the bona fide purchaser test mean,
"for all practical purposes, nothing," because "a lien which cannot
by any means be perfected as against a bona fide purchaser, not
even by seizure of the property subject to the lien, is virtually
inconceivable. 3 9
A construction which makes any provision of a statute a dead
letter is to be avoided if at all possible.40 With all the trepidation
and some of the deference a tax man should feel in jousting with
the bankruptcy experts on their home grounds, I suggest that
another construction of the proviso enables the statute to make
sense and carries out the declared intention of Congress to strike
"at a lien which is so tenuous that it can be defeated by transfer to a
bona fide purchaser. '41 I submit that the only relevant time to
which the word "subsequent" could reasonably refer is the time of
bankruptcy. At that point, the trustee acquires title and, for this
limited purpose, steps into the shoes of a bona fide purchaser.
42
The only postbankruptcy action that will relieve the lienor is one
which relates back and protects him against such an intervening
bona fide purchaser-e.g., a mechanic's lienor typically is protected
against a bona fide purchaser subsequent to commencement of the
work, provided he files notice within a prescribed period after
completion.43 This construction also appears to conform to the
39 Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42 WASH. L. REv.
681, 722-23 (1967). Professor Marsh subsequently served as Chairman of the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws.
In an effort to save the provision from being totally nugatory, as envisioned by
Professor Marsh, the First Circuit concluded that notice to the court, as a substitute for
seizure, will not meet the requirement for postbankruptcy perfection where seizure is
provided by the lien law only as a means of enforcement and not of perfection. In re J.R.
Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188, 193 (1st Cir. 1971). Contra, In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, 627
(W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
The First Circuit's view in making this one provision meaningful seems, however, to render
meaningless the other provision for notice as a substitute for seizure, because it is difficult to
conceive of a statutory lien for which seizure is provided as a means merely of perfection
rather than of enforcement.
40 Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 255 (1945); General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1968); Jennings v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 781
(Ct. Cl. 1958).
41 SENATE REPORT 7, quoting HousE REPORT 6.
Moreover, this construction may be made without the "tortuous reasoning" King has
said such an interpretation would require. See King, Post-Bankruptcy Perfection of Statutoy
Liens, 72 Com. L.J. 346-47 (1967).
42 See Seligson, Treatment of Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy-The 1966 Amendments of Section
67b and c, 27 FED. B.J. 111, 116-17 (1967).
43 The proviso was properly applied to protect a mechanic's lienor who commenced
work before, but filed after, bankruptcy, pursuant to N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13(5) (McKinney
1966). In re Chesterfield Developers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Since any lien
19741
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congressional intent merely to clarify the postbankruptcy perfec-
tion provision of the Chandler Act, 4 which had been viewed as not
permitting perfection if, at the date qf bankruptcy, the lien failed the
applicable standard of validity against a judicial lien.4 5
The second ambiguity in the proviso concerns whether the
hypothetical bona fide purchaser into whose shoes the trustee steps
includes one with some special additional attribute, since the rights
of all bona fide purchasers are not identical, entitling him to
protection not accorded purchasers generally. For example, it has
been held that- a mechanic's lien for work commenced before
bankruptcy, filed thereafter within the time prescribed by state law
for perfection against interim purchasers, is valid in bankruptcy
even though one class of purchasers-those who obtained a cove-
nant that the seller would hold the proceeds in trust for mechanic's
lienors--could have taken free of the lien.46 One questionable
decision has gone so far as to hold that a lien which is valid against
a subsequent purchaser who fails to take possession is valid in
bankruptcy, although by merely taking possession a hypothetical
purchaser could have prevailed. 47 A better reasoned opinion held,
on similar facts, that the law placed the trustee in the shoes of a
hypothetical purchaser in possession, saying that Congress "con-
templated a full-blooded, not an anemic, purchaser. 48
Similar, although perhaps distinguishable, language was found
in section 60a of the Chandler Act, making certain transfers,
incruding security interests, voidable as preferences unless "no
bona-fide purchaser" from the debtor could have acquired, within
law that permits retroactive perfection against purchasers would surely set a time limit, King's
concern about open-ended perfectibility would be satisfied by this interpretation.
44 Note 23 supra: see SENATE REPORT 13; HOUSE REPORT 11-12.
45 United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266, 278 (1965); see 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
1 67.26 (14th ed. 1971). Collier views § 70c, which gives the trustee the rights of a judicial
lien creditor at the date of bankruptcy, as predominant over § 67b, which permits postbank-
ruptcy perfection in other, respects, such as fixing by levy the amount of a property tax that
had theretofore become an inchoate lien of sufficient force to prevail over judicial liens at
the date of bankruptcy. See De Laney v. City & County of Denver, 185 F.2d 246, 252-53
(10th Cir. 1950). The 1966 amendment made it express that § 70c could not be overcome by
postbankruptcy perfection. It would be consistent with the construction of the prior
provision, which construction was merely "clarified," to conclude that the new test of
perfection against bona fide purchasers refers to those who become such on the date of
bankruptcy. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, § 5, 80 Stat. 269-70, amending
Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. 110(c) (1964) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970)).
46 In re Chesterfield Developers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
47 In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
48 In reJ.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188, 192 (Ist Cir. 1971). See Countryman, The Use of
State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pt. II), 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631, 640-45 (1972).
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the four months before bankruptcy, rights in the property superior
to the transferee's rights.49 The Supreme Court construed this
language to render voidable a security assignment of accounts
receivable which, because of failure to comply with state law
requiring notification of the account debtors, was subject to defeat
by a subsequent bona fide assignee who did-give such notice,
although not by one who failed to do so. 50 And even where such a
security assignment was valid under state law against a later pur-
chaser of the accounts without need for notification of the account
debtors, one court nevertheless held the assignment voidable in
bankruptcy because it might be defeated by a later purchaser if he
obtained payment or a novation from or judgment against the
debtors. 51 Another decision, however, rejected that view on the
ground that the first assignment in such a case is vulnerable not to
the second assignee's status as *a bona fide purchaser but to the
purchaser's later activities. 52 A district court held, under former
section 60a, that a trust receipt transaction, of which notice was
duly filed sufficient to protect against a later security interest in or
bulk sale of the goods in derogation of the security, nevertheless
constituted a voidable preference because, at the time of bank-
ruptcy, purchasers in the ordinary course of business could have taken
free of the security interest. In reversing on other grounds, the
Fourth Circuit expressed the strong view that a distinction should
be drawn between a bona fide purchaser and a buyer in the
ordinary course of trade, and that the Act was never intended to
upset a transfer that involved a lien duly placed on public record.53
One of the statutory liens affected by the foregoing rules of
bankruptcy law is the federal tax lien. For over a century it has
19 Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act (now codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970)
(emphasis added)) as amended by the Chandler Act (Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 60, 52
Stat. 869), used absolute terms in prescribing that no bona fide purchasers be able to acquire
superior rights. However, present § 67c(I)(B) (11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B) (1970)), in speaking
of "one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser," may leave the courts more room for
choosing the variety of bona fide purchaser referred to.
"o Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (194"3). As a result
of that decision, the bona fide purchaser test of perfection for preference purposes was later
abandoned in favor of a judicial lien test. Act of March 18, 1950, ch. 70, § 1, 64 Stat. 24,
amending Bankruptcy Act § 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1952) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)
(1970)).
51 In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943).
52 In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 835 (1947).
13 Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1951), rez'g In
re Harvey Distrib. Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1950). The Fourth Circuit's view of the
matter was dictum, since the decision actually rested upon the intervening retroactive
amendment abandoning the bona fide purchaser test. See note 50 supra.
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been the view of the Congress that it is not enough to rely, for the
collection of taxes, on a mere right of priority, however absolute, in
the assets remaining in an insolvent estate.54 Congress has felt the
need for a lien that exists regardless of insolvency and follows the
property even into the hands of third parties acquiring interests
between the time when the tax is assessed and the time when the
enforcement machinery can be brought to bear. The law provides,
therefore, that a lien on all the property of the taxpayer, real and
personal, tangible and intangible, shall automatically arise when
any federal tax is assessed, if the tax is not paid on demand. 55
Against many forms of competing liens, the federal tax lien is
effective as a secret encumbrance, without need for notice of any
kind. 56 Originally, the secret lien was valid even against bona fide
purchasers, 57 but later legislation has provided progressively
greater protection for purchasers, holders of security interests,
mechanic's lienors, and judgment lien creditors, unless notice of
the tax lien has been duly filed in the office designated by law.5 8
Since the tax lien attaches automatically to additional property
whenever the taxpayer acquires it,59 Marsh has characterized it as
"a general, floating lien. '60 It differs markedly from the typical
floating lien, however, in that, although the federal tax lien may
float onto after-acquired property, one that is duly perfected never
floats qf.f, but, except in very limited circumstances, follows the
property even into the hands of an innocent, albeit negligent,
purchaser.6 1 Since it is enforceable against third parties apart from
any insolvency or liquidation proceeding, a perfected federal tax
lien, as well as those state tax liens which are imposed in similar
terms, 62 clearly has the characteristics of "genuine property rights,"
rather than of those "spurious statutory liens . . . which were in
reality priorities" that Congress has heretofore invalidated in
bankruptcy. 63
54 Note 12 supra; see notes 339-74 and accompanying text infra.
55 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6321-22 (originally enacted as Act of July 13, 1866, ch.
184, § 9, 14 Stat. 107).
56 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
57 United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
58 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323. See generally W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS, chs. 2-5
(3d ed. 1972).
59 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
60 Marsh, supra note 39, at 710.
61 Pipola v. Chicco, 274 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Stutsman County
Implement Co., 274 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1960).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
63 See note 30 supra. The federal tax lien "is as binding as a mortgage, and has the same
1000 [Vol. 59:991
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Under present law, therefore, a federal tax lien duly filed
before bankruptcy, or a state tax lien with equivalent characteris-
tics, is valid against judgment lien creditors and, under normal
circumstance, against bona fide purchasers. 64 It also enjoys lien
status in the distribution of the estate subject to postponement in
favor of administration expenses and preferred wage claims, so far
as the liens attach to personal property.65 On the other hand, if the
lien is not so filed, it is invalid against the trustee in his 'judgment
creditor" capacity and therefore is not saved by the fact that
postbankruptcy filing would perfect it against subsequent bona fide
purchasers.6 6 Hence, taxes secured only by unfiled liens are collect-
ible in bankruptcy only as unsecured claims, which may or may not
enjoy priority over general creditors.67 In some circumstances even
a duly filed tax lien may be denied lien status in bankruptcy on the
ground that, although it is valid against judgment creditors, there
is no means, short of seizure under levy, by which it may be
perfected against certain bona fide purchasers. A filed federal tax
lien attaching to securities, for example, is unconditionally invalid
against bona fide purchasers for full value, 68 and such a lien on a'
motor vehicle is invalid against a purchaser who obtains possession
before gaining actual notice or knowledge of the lien and who does
not thereafter relinquish possession to the seller.6 9 A filed federal
tax lien on inventory is invalid against purchasers at retail in the
ordinary course of the seller's business,7 0 but is protected against
other purchasers. Also, a filed federal tax lien on household goods,
personal effects, and similar articles is invalid under certain condi-
tions against a bona fide purchaser "in a casual sale for less than
$250.1171 In any of these situations, the lien is perfectible under the
tax law by seizure as against purchasers subsequent to the seizure.
capacity to hold the land [or other property] so long as the statute preserves it in force."
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954), quoting Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 104-05 (1827).
64 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6321, 6333(a).
6' See notes 28-29 supra.
66 Postbankruptcy perfection against purchasers suffices only where there has been
prebankruptcy perfection against judgment creditors. See notes 36-37 and accompanying
text supra.
67 In re Autorama Tool & Die Co., 412 F.2d 369 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1043 (1970); see notes 126-33 and accompanying text infra.
68 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(b)(1)(A). "Securities" include stock, bonds, negotiable
instruments, and the like. Id. § 6323(h)(4).
69 Id. § 6323(b)(2).
70 Id. § 6323(b)(3).
7' Id. § 6323(b)(4).
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Hence, it could be retroactively validated as a lien in bankruptcy by
later notice to the bankruptcy court, .if Marsh and King are correct
that that kind of perfectibility meets the requirement of the Bank-
ruptcy Act-and thus makes it mean, "for all practical purposes,
nothing. '7 2 Even if their interpretation is not accepted, 73 the lien
on motor vehicles may nevertheless be valid in bankruptcy if, as
one court has held but another has denied, perfection against a
purchaser who fails to obtain possession satisfies the requirement of
the Act even though the lien is ineffective against a purchaser with
possession.7 4 Moreover, the lien on inventory and on household
goods and personal effects may be valid if the Act means that
perfection against purchasers in general suffices even though pur-
chasers in particular circumstances could take free of the lien. 75
Tax liens antedating bankruptcy compete with other liens and
security interests on substantially the same terms as if bankruptcy
had not occurred. 76 It is entirely possible, therefore, that a tax lien
that is invalid in bankruptcy because unfiled, or perhaps because
not perfectible against bona fide purchasers, may nevertheless
enjoy priority over some other lien or security interest that is valid
in bankruptcy but against which the tax lien is effective without
filing. Circuity of liens would result: the tax lien is superior to the
other lien or security interest; the other lien or security interest is
in.turn superior to the trustee; and the trustee is superior to the
tax lien. Neither the tax collector nor the junior lienor or secured
party may ordinarily benefit from this circuity, however, since the
trustee is entitled to have the invalidated tax lien preserved for the
benefit of the estate. The estate thereby takes advantage of the tax
lien's priority over the junior lien or interest and the trustee's
priority over the tax lien.77 Circuity may also result when the tax
collector files a lien on, but does not take possession of, personal
property which is subjected to a later security interest or indefeasi-
ble nontax lien or of which another tax lienor takes possession
thereafter but before bankruptcy. In such situations, the junior
72 See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
7' See notes 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
'4 See notes 47-48 supra.
75 See note 53 supra.
76 In re Thriftway Auto Rental Corp., 457 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 386 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1967); Dallas v. United States, 369 F.2d 645
(5th Cir. 1966).
77 Bankruptcy Act § 67c(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(2) (1970). However, if for any reason the
invalidated tax lien is not so preserved, the junior liens are promoted at the expense of the
tax claim. Id.
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lienor has rights superior to general administration expenses and
wage claims, but inferior to those of the tax collector, whose lien,
however, is postponed to administration and wage claims.78 In this
type of case the Bankruptcy'Act adopts a different solution to the
circuity problem: an amount equal to the superior tax lien is first
set aside and the junior lien is satisfied from what remains; then,
administration expenses and wage claims are paid from the
amount set aside for the tax lien; the unsatisfied portion of the tax
then becomes an unsecured claim.7 9
2. The Commission's Proposals
Departing sharply from Congress's historic policy, the Com-
mission proposes to invalidate in bankruptcy, including reorganiza-
tion and rehabilitation proceedings as well as straight liquidations,
every common law or statutory lien 8° with the exception of (1) a
lien securing a debt for the repair, preservation, shipment, storage,
manufacture, or improvement of the liened property, (2) a lien
securing a general ad valorem tax on such property, (3) a lien
securing a special assessment to defray the cost of a public im-
provement, or (4) a lien for expenses and fees of an attorney in
obtaining a judgment or settlement.8 ' With those exceptions, re-
gardless of whether a particular lien is created by federal or state
law, whether it attaches to real or personal property, or even
whether it had been so far perfected that neither a judgment
creditor nor a bona fide purchaser could have acquired superior
rights at the date of the petition, the Commission views it as a mere
right of priority which must yield to the priority scheme of the
Bankruptcy Act.
The Commission's position reflects its chairman's expressed
71 See notes 28-29 supra.
7' Bankruptcy Act § 67c(3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3) (1970). Adopted in 1966, this
provision confirmed thejudical solution adopted in California State Dep't of Employment v.
United States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954).
'o The definition of "statutory lien" (Bankruptcy Act § 1(29a), I1 U.S.C. § 1(29a)
(1970)) is refined to make clear that "a lien resulting from ajudicial act or proceeding" is not
included therein. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 1-102(45).
8' PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-606(a). The excepted liens would be valid only if
perfected against judicial liens at the date of the petition (id. § 4-604(a), restating Bankruptcy
Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § I10(c) (1970)) and if either the lien is a matter of public record as
against the specific property or notice of the lien is given to the trustee within 30 days after
the lien claimant learns of the filing of the petition. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-606(c).
The further requirement of perfection against bona fide purchasers, which the Commission
(citing its chairman, Marsh, supra note 39, at 721-23) regards as virtually .meaningless, would
be abandoned.
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disenchantment with several inept legislative attempts to draw the
line between those statutory liens that are true property rights,
justifiably relied upon as security against all the world, and those
that merely determine, in contravention of the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act, the order of distribution of whatever assets the
debtor possesses when the roof falls in.82 The Commission would
abandon the effort to draw such a distinction and would throw the
baby out with the bath water. The present distinction, based on
whether the lien would follow the property into the hands of a
bona fide purchaser, would be perfectly sound were it not for an
apparent "last-minute drafting bobble" 83 introducing an ambigu-
ous time reference into a provision that makes sense only if it
means that the trustee prevails over any statutory lien that is not,
and cannot retroactively be, perfected against one becoming a bona
fide purchaser on the date of bankruptcy. 84 This logical time reference
should not be too difficult to express in the law now that attention
has been focused on the ambiguity. Such an amendment would be
preferable to the Commission's proposal. The test should be
further refined to make clear whether the hypothetical bona fide
purchaser in whose shoes the trustee is placed includes one with
"special additional attributes such as possession, a special contract
of purchase . . . or the status of a buyer in ordinary course of
business. 8s 5 The trustee should be in the position of a "full-
blooded, not an anemic, purchaser"8 6-i.e., one who has done
everything that an encumbrancer or bulk purchaser could do to
perfect his interest, such as taking possession, but not one who is a
member of a special class of purchasers, such as retail purchasers,
whose characteristics are not shared by the trustee and the cred-
itors he represents.8 7
82 Marsh, supra note 39, at 732-34. The Commission's notes to Proposed § 4-606 echo
Marsh's hyperbole that section 67c(1)(B) invalidates only "liens on ambulatory houses in
Pennsylvania and the get of bulls, rams and boars in Colorado." Marsh, supra note 39, at
722-23 n. 94. The text of its report states that "recognition [of statutory liens] substantially
frustrates the goals of equality and uniformity, and it has generated a substantial amount of
litigation and made the Act considerably more complex." COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAwS
OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT, PART I, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 212 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT].
83 See Countryman, supra note 48, at 641.
84 See notes 37-45 and accompanying text supra.
85 Countryman, supra note 48, at 644. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra.
86 Countryman, supra note 48, at 643.
87 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(4), 11 U.S.C. §96(a)(4) (1970). That provision declares that
the judicial lien against which-a transfer must be perfected in order to avoid treatment as a
preference "does not include liens which under applicable law are given a special priority
over other liens which are prior in time." This language has no counterpart in Proposed
1004 [Vol. 59:991
TAX RECOMMENDATIONS
With respect to tax liens, other than those for ad valorem taxes
and special assessments, Chairman Marsh has conceded that they
may be "necessary outside of bankruptcy for the efficient collection
of the revenue and for the purpose of protecting the Government
against subsequent purchasers and secured parties, ' 88 as well as for
providing a convenient reference point in the race of diligence. He
insists, however, that "none of this is relevant" in insolvency pro-
ceedings because the "[p]riorities [then] -are established by the
statute" and "the Government no longer needs any collection
procedure or any protection against subsequent parties. '89 On the
contrary, there is as much need for protection against creditors
generally, represented by the trustee, at this point as there is at an
earlier stage against creditors obtaining judgment liens. Whether
the "priorities are established by the statute" depends upon the
resolution of the point in issue-i.e., whether the tax for which a
lien has been perfected qualifies as a secured or unsecured claim.
Marsh declares further that "[t]o say that an income tax claim
should be entitled to the super priority of a secured debt simply
because it has been assessed the day before bankruptcy, but that
the same claim should be demoted to a fourth priority if it is
assessed the day after bankruptcy is irrational," since "[t]his factor
has nothing to do either with the equities of the situation or with
the needs of the fisc." 90 It has much to do with "the needs of the
fisc," however, in that vendors, hospitals, landlords, and other
holders of statutory liens have the alternative of demanding and
perfecting contractual security interests as a means of protecting
themselves against the trustee, while the Government's only practi-
cal means of protection if collection cannot be effected within the
proposed time limitations on priority9' is to perfect the statutory
lien which Congress for a century has provided for its security.
92
As for the equities of the unsecured creditors, those who "supplied
the bankrupt with goods and funds during the period immediately
§ 4-607(g)(6), which the Commission considers a "simplified version [that] says all that is
needed." PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-607 Note 27.
88 Marsh, supra note 39, at 728.
89 Id.
90 Id. A similar proposal, limited to the invalidation of tax liens on personal property,
was advanced by the National Bankruptcy Conference a quarter century ago. Moore &
Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 YALE L.J. 683, 701
(1948); Olive, Taxes in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 25 TAXES 5, 7 (1947). But that feature was
deleted from the proposal long before a much modified version was finally enacted in 1966.
See note 126 infra.
9' See notes 224-56 and accompanying text infra.
92 See notes 54-63 and accompanying text supra.
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prior to bankruptcy," which may constitute the bulk of his remain-
ing assets, 93 may have just cause for complaint if a last-minute tax
lien consumes those assets. But a tax lien that has been on file for
three months, for'instance, gives the last minute supplier of goods
or funds as much warning as a duly filed security interest; he has
no cause for complaint if he failed to make a proper credit check.
Such equities may justify treatment of the perfection of a tax lien
against an insolvent debtor within three months before the petition
as a voidable preference, 94 but not the invalidation of a lien
perfected earlier or during solvency.
The Commission argues that the tax lien priority is not
needed:
Data submitted to the Commission by the Treasury Department
establishes that the total amount collected by the Federal Gov-
ernment as a result of all its liens and priorities in bankruptcy
proceedings is insignificant in the total federal budget. It is the
view of the Commission that it is unseemly for the Federal
Government to insist upon collecting its taxes at the expense of
other creditors of the taxpayer, and that the only possible
justification for this would be a plea of necessity in order to keep
the government functioning. As indicated above, such a plea
would be totally without foundation in fact.95
The Commission could with equal 'reason contend that there is no
justification for preferring filed tax liens over general creditors
outside of bankruptcy since the amount of tax collected by lien
enforcement is a mere drop in -the federal budgetary bucket-or
that policemen need.not carry guns because the occasions for their
use are infrequent. The removal of the threat of the collection
weapon, however, might well cause delinquencies to skyrocket; the
opportunity for creditors to thwart filed tax liens by throwing the
debtor into bankruptcy would surely greatly increase the number
a' See Olive, supra note 90, at 6.
94 Under Proposed § 4-607(a), a "transfer" made "to pay or secure" an antecedent debt,
if made within three months before the petition and while the debtor was insolvent, whether
or not the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that he was, is a voidable preference.
Proposed § 1-102(46) defines "transfer" to include the fixing of a lien on property. Proposed
§ 1-104, abrogating the former rule that the sovereign is not bound by the Bankruptcy Act
unless a provision is expressly made applicable to it (United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 251 (1874)), makes all provisions applicable to the United States, the states, and their
subdivisions unless expressly provided otherwise. Moreover, Proposed § 1-102(17) defines
"debt" broadly enough to embrace taxes. It would seem, therefore, that a tax lien perfected
tinder those circumstances would be voidable, even if tax liens were not generally invali-
dated.
95 BANKRUPTcY COMM'N REPORT 22. The annual amount collected in bankruptcy on
liens and priorities is estimated by the Treasury at about $44,000,000. Id. 234.
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of bankruptcies and the amount of federal taxes involved therein.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Commission's proposals to
eliminate the present requirement of an act of bankruptcy before
involuntary bankruptcy-can be sought.96
The new proposal, like present law, entitles the trustee to ask
the court to preserve an invalidated lien for the benefit of the
estate; hence, unsecured creditors, rather than holders of junior
liens valid in bankruptcy, would profit from the invalidation of the
otherwise senior statutory lien.97
The debasement of the once favored statutory liens, including
tax liens, is carried so far that any amounts paid or property
transferred within three months before the petition, in voluntary
or involuntary satisfaction of the obligation secured by the invali-
dated lien, is unconditionally recoverable by the trustee, even if the
debtor was solvent at the time of the transfer. 98 This provision goes
even further than the Commission's broadened attack on prefer-
ences generally, which make preferential payments and transfers
with respect to antecedent debts not secured voidable if the debtor
was insolvent at the time, whether or not the preferred creditor
had reasonable cause to believe that insolvency existed, and raises a
rebuttable presumption that the debtor was insolvent throughout
the three-month period preceding the petition. 99 The odd result is
that a federal tax promptly paid within the applicable period by a
demonstrably solvent taxpayer, before a lien arises, is not a recov-
erable preference. But if the tax is not paid within the ten days
usually allowed, thus causing a lien to arise,100 a payment made any
time thereafter is recoverable by the trustee and thrown into the
pot for distribution in accordance with the priorities. 101
Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 4-205(c) permits maintenance of an involuntary petition
upon a mere showing that the debtor "will be generally unable" or "has generally failed" to
pay his debts as they become due.
97 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-610. This provision restates, inter alia, Bankruptcy
Act § 67c(2) (11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(2) (1970)) and applies to a transfer voidable under Proposed
§ 4-606. Since tax liens would no longer be recognized at all, the current provision for
postponing tax liens on personalty to administration expenses and certain wages is deleted.
See note 29 supra.
98 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-606(b).
9 Id. §§ 4-607(a), (f). Compare Bankruptcy Act § 60b, 11, U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970).
Preferences occurring within one year would be made voidable if the creditor occupied one
of certain close relationships to the bankrupt; but in this case the trustee would still be
required to show that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent.
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-607(a)(2).
'00 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6155, 6321, 6331(a).
101 Concerning subjection of the sovereign to the recovery of preferences, see note 94
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B. Priority of Nonlien Tax Claims and Other Claims
1. Current Law
Although the earliest federal bankruptcy laws incorporated
the principle of absolute priority of federal claims, 10 2 subsequent
acts have moved progressively toward "a reasonable classification of
claims as entitled to priority because of superior equities,"' 0 3 as the
"demands of social, economic, and political policy .. .resulted in
deviations from a strict rule of equality among creditors."'0 4 Wage
claims, limited in amount, first gained recognition as a priority class
in 1841105 and steadily improved in position, being elevated in
1898 above federal and state claims for other than taxes.' 0 6 They
continued to be inferior to all tax claims' 0 7 until 1926, when they
were moved ahead of taxes and the amount entitled to priority was
increased to $600 for each claimant, earned within three months
before bankruptcy. 0 8 Since 1938, wages have enjoyed the highest
priority among unsecured claims, subject only to administration
expenses,10 9 and the portion of the bankrupt estate available for
preferred wage claims has been further enhanced by the subordi-
nation of tax liens on personalty, even though otherwise valid and
fully perfected, whenever such liens are not accompanied by pos-
session or enforced by sale before bankruptcy."10 Unlike the rule
102 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1804). The pertinent provisions of
the 1800, 1841, and 1867 Acts are quoted in United States v. Anderson, 334 F.2d 111,
114-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964).
10' See Carpenter v. Wabash Ry., 309 U.S. 23, 28 (1940).
104 SENATE REPORT 2, quoting HOUSE REPORT 2.
105 Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 5, 5 Stat. 444. This Act limited claims to $25 earned
within six months. This was increased to $50 by the Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 28, 14
Stat. 531. Both laws were short-lived. See notes 16-17 supra.
10 Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912); Act of
July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64b(4), 30 Stat. 563.The amount of wages entitled to priority was
then $300 earned within three months.
107 Oliver v. United States, 268 U.S. 1 (1925); Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64a, 30
Stat. 563.
"' 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). The Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 15, 44 Stat. 667,
amended §§ 64a and 64b(5)-(6) of the original Act to accomplish this aim. The $600 limit has
remained constant despite nearly 50 years of deterioration in the value of the dollar.
109 The last remaining higher priority, for certain expenses of creditors, was demoted
below wages by the Chandler Act. 11 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)(2)-(3) (1970).
110 Subject to the conditions stated, the Chandler Act (Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52
Stat. 875) thus subordinated statutory liens. The 1952 amendments (Act of July 7, 1952, ch.
579, § 21, 66 Stat. 427) continued the subordination of tax liens and invalidated other
statutory liens. Later law (Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495,,§ 4, 80 Stat. 268 (1966))
restored certain statutory liens to secured status in bankruptcy and continued the subordina-
tion of tax liens. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 67c(3), (5), 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(c)(3), (5) (1970).
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under some state laws,11' however, the federal bankruptcy law does
not extend the wage priority to unpaid contributions to pension' 12
and welfare funds,' 3 although the priority does extend, within
applicable limits, to accrued vacation pay"14 and vacation fund
contributions,"15 back pay awards, ' 6 and dismissal or severance
pay."17
Debts and taxes owing to a state enjoyed no priority in bank-
ruptcy until the 1867 Act; thereafter their priority was junior to all
federal claims and was confined to claims of the state in which the
proceeding was pending." 8 The permanent bankruptcy legislation
of 1898 placed all unsecured federal, state, and local taxes,
whether or not of the home jurisdiction, on a parity1' 9 which they
have continued to experience under later Acts.' 20 The top priority
then enjoyed has been steadily eroded, first in the 1926 and 1938
legislation seeking to improve the position of wage-earners, 12' and
ultimately, but only in a limited way, for the benefit of general
creditors.
More than a quarter century ago, a movement developed in
the American Bar Association 22 and the National Bankruptcy
Conference to restrict the priority of federal and other taxes
which, unknown to creditors who finance the taxpayer's opera-
tions, often accumulate over an extended period and, when bank-
ruptcy finally occurs, are likely to consume all or the greater part
of the estate. Initially, the proposal sought to reduce to general
creditor status every claim for taxes, whether or not supported by a
lien, if the last day of the period for which the tax is incurred is
"' See, e.g., N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 22 (McKinney Supp. 1973): Dunlop v.
Tremayne, 62 Cal. 2d 427, 398 P.2d 774, 42 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1965).
112 Joint Indus. Bd. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
11 United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
114 In re Ad Serv. Engraving Co., 338 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1964).
"1 In re E.V. Moore of Cal., Inc., 447 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1971).
116 NLRB v. Killoren, 122 F.2d 609 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 696 (1941); cf.
Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
117 McCloskey v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 200 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1952): In
re Public Ledger, 161 F.2d 762, 773 (3d Cir. 1947). But f. In re Ad Serv. Engraving Co., 338
F.2d 41, 43-44 (6th Cir. 1964).
118 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 28, 14 Stat. 531.
119 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64a, 30 Stat. 563 (codified in substantially modified
form at 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970)); New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 489 (1906).
120 See Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1936).
121 See notes 108 & 110 supra.
122 It appears to have originated in 1946 with the Committee on Bankruptcy Law of the
American Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking, and Commercial Law. See J.
MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 102 (1956); Olive, supra note 90, at 6.
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more than one year before bankruptcy.2 3 That proposal was
criticized for its failure to take account of the differences in the
complexities of different types of taxes and the possibility that
controversy over the amount payable might often preclude collec-
tion action within the year following the tax period. 124
As enacted in 1966, the law 2 5 leaves the status of perfected
tax liens undisturbed, but provides that priority status is denied for
nonlien taxes that "became legally due and owing" more than three
years before bankruptcy. 126 The three year period corresponds to
the basic period of limitations for the determination of federal
taxes127 and, therefore, was considered to afford ample opportu-
nity not only to assess any tax but also to collect it or to protect it by
filing notice of a lien.' 21 The phrase, "became legally due and
owing," has been in the priority section since 1898 in order to
distinguish provable prebankruptcy tax claims from those accruing
during bankruptcy. It has long been held that a tax becomes
"legally due and owing" when the event occurs which fixes the
liability for tax, even though a return is not yet due and the tax is
not collectible until a later date. 29 But the 1966 legislative history
indicates that, for the purpose of measuring the "staleness" of a tax
claim, the time runs from the date prescribed for payment of the
123 The original American Bar Association version of the proposal is described in Olive,
supra note 90, at 6-8. The original National Bankruptcy Conference version would have
excepted taxes secured by a lien of the kind not subject to postponement under Bankruptcy
Act § 67c-i.e., a lien on realty or a lien on personalty not reduced to possession or enforced
by sale. Moore & Tone, supra note 90, at 701. The proposal was first introduced in Congress
as H.R. 5829, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1948).
124 J. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 122, at 102; Moore & Tone, supra note 90, at 702-03.
12" For a detailed discussion of the terms of and the defects in-the law, see Plumb,
Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade I, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 263-72 (1967).
126 The priority provision, § 64a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act (II U.S.C. § 104(a)(4)
(1970)), merely excludes from the fourth, priority level taxes "which are not released by a
discharge in bankruptcy," making it necessary to refer to the discharge provision, § 17a(1)
(11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1970)), for the applicable rules.
127 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(a).
128 S. REP. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1966); H.R. REP. No. 687, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1965).
129 New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 494 (1906). By this standard, a tax based on
income becomes "legally due and owing" at the close of the taxable year. In re International
Match Co., 79 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1935); In re Cooney, 35 Am. Bankr. Rep. (n.s.) 247
(N.D.N.Y. 1938). An employment or excise tax becomes "legally due and owing" as each
wage payment is made or taxable transaction occurs. In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184,
190 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Otte v. United States, 414 U.S. 1156 (1974); In re
John-Horne Co., 220 F2d 33 (7th Cir. 1955). But cf. In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336
F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1964) (making cutoff even earlier).
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tax, rather than from any earlier date, 30 and the courts so far have
accepted that view. 13'
In partial recognition of the practicalities of tax administra-
tion, the 1966 statute provides four exceptions to the three-year
cutoff: (1) where the bankrupt has failed to make a return re-
quired by law, if the tax was not assessed or was assessed within one
year before bankruptcy; (2) where the tax liability was not reported
on the return made by the bankrupt and was not assessed before
bankruptcy by reason of a prohibition on assessment pending the
exhaustion of administrative or judicial remedies available to the
bankrupt;132 (3) where the bankrupt had made a false or fraudu-
lent return, or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat
the tax; and (4) where the amount was collected or withheld by the
bankrupt from others, such as his employees, and was not paid
over.
33
Federal claims for items other than taxes, which shared with
taxes the top priority under earlier acts, were not expressly men-
tioned in the Act of 1898, although it was provided generally
therein that debts owing to any "person," if entitled to priority
under any federal or state law, should occupy the priority level
next above general claims. 134 In 1925, the Supreme Court, holding
that the United States is not a "person," concluded that the general
130 112 CONG. REC. 13,814 (1966); cf. S. REP. No. 1158, supra note 128, at 3.
31 In re Kopf, 299 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); In re Reeves, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9314 (D. Colo. 1969).
132 Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1970) (made applicable by id.
§ 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970)). In enacting this exception, Congress particularly had
in mind federal income tax deficiencies which normally cannot be assessed and collected
until the taxpayer has first been issued a deficiency notice and given an opportunity to
contest the liability in the Tax Court (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a)), although the fact
that jeopardy assessments may be made in appropriate circumstances (such as approaching
bankruptcy) makes the prohibition less than absolute (id. § 6861). The exception extends to
any undetermined income tax deficiency, whether or not a Tax Court proceeding had been
instituted before bankruptcy, and whether the deficiency results from undisclosed income or
unallowable deductions. In re Michaud, 458 F.2d 953 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876
(1972); In re Indian Lake Estates, Inc., 428 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964
(1970). Once the controversy is resolved and the tax assessed, however, and if the basic three
year period since the due date has then expired, the tax instantly becomes subject to
dischargeability and loss of priority if bankruptcy then occurs. No grace period is allowed for
collection efforts. See Plumb, supra note 125, at 266-68.
"3 Bankruptcy Act j§ 17a(1)(a)-(e), 11 U.S.C. §§ 35(a)(1)(a)-(e) (1970). These provisions
also are applicable to the determination of priorities. Id. § 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4)
(1970).
234 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64a(5), 30 Stat. 563.
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federal insolvency priority statute'3 5 was not thereby made applic-
able in bankruptcy, and relegated federal nontax claims to the
status of general debts without priority. 136 Justice Holmes's dictum
that "[p]ublic opinion as to the peculiar rights and preferences due
to the sovereign has changed"'3M proved premature, however, since
Congress, without so much as an explanatory word in the legisla-
tive history, restored the government's nontax priority in bank-
ruptcy one year later, although placing it behind taxes and wages
and on the same level as any other claims to which state or federal
law might give priority.' 38 Since the Chandler Act of 1938 elimi-
nated the recognition of all state law priorities except those of
landlords, federal nontax claims stand equal to landlords' claims on
the lowest priority level above general claims; nontax claims of the
states, often favored under their own laws, enjoy no priority in
bankruptcy. 139
The foregoing priority rules, established by section 64a of the
Bankruptcy Act, are also made applicable in debtor relief proceed-
ings under Chapters XI and XIII. 40 Their application is expressly
precluded, however, in corporate reorganizations under Chapter X
unless the reorganization fails and straight bankruptcy follows. 1 4'
In Chapter X proceedings, the rules of priority in equity receiver-
ships are controlling, 142 cardinal among which is the ancient fed-
eral statute143requiring that, if the estate is insolvent, the United
States must not only enjoy first priority, perhaps even ahead of
otherwise senior secured obligations, 44 but also must be paid first
M2 See note 12 supra.
136 Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315 (1925).
137 Id. at 318.
M3 Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 15, 44 Stat. 666 (amending Bankruptcy Act
§ 64a(7)). The 1926 amendment included the United States in the definition of the term
"person."
139 Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (1970).
140 In re Belkin, 358 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1966); In re Chicago Express, Inc., 332 F.2d 276
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964), Bankruptcy Act §§ 302, 337(2), 602, 659(6), 11
U.S.C. §§ 702, 737(2), 1002, 1059(6) (1970). Whether § 64a is incorporated into the
provisions relating to real property arrangements (Chapter XII) is unclear from the Act's
language. Bankruptcy Act § 402, 11 U.S.C. § 802 (1970). See T. FINLETrER, THE LAw OF
BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 345-46 (1939).
141 Bankruptcy Act § 102, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970).
142 United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 329-32 (1970); United States v. Anderson, 334
F.2d 111, 115-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964).
'43 REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970); see note 12 supra.
144 On its face, the federal insolvency priority is absolute and admits of no exceptions.
See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 357 (1964). The Supreme Court has pointedly
left open the question whether the most specific and perfected of liens (see United States v.
Gilbert Assoc., 345 U.S. 361, 365 (1953)), or even a prior mortgage (see New York v. Maclay,
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in time. 14 5 In railroad reorganizations under section 77, section 64a
rules also seem clearly to be made inapplicable 146 by section 77(b)
of the Act, 14 7 which adopts the equity receivership rules of priority
and which has, therefore, been held to incorporate the statutory
requirement of first payment of federal claims, if the railroad is
insolvent. 48  Even when the insolvency priority statute is
inapplicable-i.e., when the debtor is not insolvent in the "balance
sheet" sense of having an excess of liabilities over debts1 49-section
77 prescribes that no plan of reorganization of a railroad or other
corporation can be confirmed if it fails to provide for full payment,
not necessarily first in time, of federal taxes and customs duties,
unless the Treasury agrees to accept a lesser amount. 50
Among the rules of priority applicable in equity receiverships
is the so-called "six-month rule." This rule is a judidal doctrine
under which liabilities for supplies, materials, and services neces-
sary for operating railroads and certain other public service
businesses, within a limited period, usually six months, before the
commencement of the proceeding, enjoy priority over general
creditors and, in limited circumstances, even over mortgagees.15 1
288 U.S. 290, 294 (1933)) could prevail over the federal priority. Lower courts, however,
have recognized the superiority of both mortgages (Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs
Mfg. Co., 246 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 868 (1957)) and "choate" liens
(United States v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1954)), subject to a most
exacting test of "choateness." United States v. Gilbert Assoc., supra. In any event, even if not
absolutely preferred, federal taxes for which liens have been perfected enjoy secured status
in the reorganization (United States v. Harris, 287 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 U.S. 38 (1962)), free of the subordination effect of § 67c(3) of the Act (11
U.S.C. § 107(c)(3) (1970); see notes 28-29 supra) because that section is made inapplicable in
Chapter X cases by § 67c(5) (11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(5) (1970)).
"I United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1970) (disapproving plan providing for
installment payment of federal taxes concurrently with other debts).
' Declarations .in some decisions that "Section 64 . . . is applicable to a proceeding
under Section 77" (e.g., In re New York, 0. & W. Ry., 25 F. Supp. 709, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)),
refer not to the system of priorities, but to a jurisdictional proviso that has since been
relocated in § 2a(2A) of the Act (11 U.S.C. § I I(a)(2A) (1970)) by the Act of July 5, 1966
(Pub. L. No. 89-496, § 1, 80 Stat. 270). See Plumb, The Federal Priority in Insolvency: Proposals
for Reform, 70 Micui. L. REv. 1, 15-16 n.81 (1971).
147 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1970).
"' In re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 463 F.2d 73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972);
see United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1970).
"' United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253 (1923) (holding REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875),
31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970), inapplicable where there is insolvency only in "equity" sense of
inability to pay debts as they mature in ordinary course of business). There may be a § 77 or
Chapter X proceeding even though there is insolvency only in the "equity" sense. Bank-
ruptcy Act §§ 77(a), 131(1), 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(a), 530(1) (1970).
"I0 Bankruptcy Act §§ 77(e) (3d ), 199, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(e) (3d ), 599 (1970); see
United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 327-29 (1970). See also Plumb, supra note 146, at 16 19.
"' Fosdick- v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1878). For a summary of the extent to which
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The objective of the rule is "to encourage the extension of credit to
corporations delivering important public services at a time when
they are financially weak," and thus "to prevent the interruption of
services to the public and to preserve the value of the corporate
assets for the other creditors." '52 On rare occasions, it has been
applied even to private businesses whose inability to operate would
have caused loss to creditors but not to the public.' 53But the better
view, when the public interest is not involved, is to refrain from
imposing a preference upon senior creditors "for their own good"
if they have not consented thereto. 154
In Chapter XI proceedings and others governed by section
64a, the express enumeration of certain priorities precludes recog-
nition of others, such as those which would otherwise be allowable
under the six-month rule.15 5 On the other hand, section 77(b) of
the Act, directing that "unsecured claims, which would have been
entitled to priority if a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor had
been appointed by a Federal court on the day of the approval of the
petition, shall be entitled to such priority and the holders of such
claims shall be treated as a separate class or classes of creditors,"' 56
was unquestionably designed to make the six-month rule applicable
"'six-month" claims may prevail over mortgagees, a matter on which there is substantial
division of authority, see Plumb, supra note 146, at 46 n.241.
.-2 In re Hallmark Medical Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding
nursing home sufficiently involved with public interest to come within the rule). The rule has
been applied to other public service businesses providing gas, light, telephones, heating,
transportation, and irrigation. In re Madison Rys., 115 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1940); Crane Co. v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 238 F. 693 (9th Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 244 U.S. 658 (1917); Pennsylvania
Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 216 F. 458 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 632 (1915);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Memphis Gaslight Co., 125 F. 97 (6th Cir. 1903); Keelyn v.
Carolina Mut. Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 F. 29 (C.C.D. S.C. 1898); Atlantic Trust Co. v. Wood-
bridge Canal & Irrigation Co., 79 F. 39 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897); see FitzGibbon, The Present
Status of the Six Months' Rule, 34 COLuM. L. Rsv. 230, 233 n.8 (1934). But see In re Richards, 43
F. Supp. 733, 734 (M.D. Pa. 1942) (holding rule inapplicable to motor carrier since service
could be duplicated without resort to power of eminent domain).
"' Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945) (using
language broader than case required); L'Hote v. Boyet, 85 Miss. 636, 38 So. 1 (1905);
Drennen v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 115 Ala. 592, 23 So. 164 (1897); see Jacobson,
Shall the Six Month Priority Rule Be Applied to Hotel Receiverships?, 40 CoM. L.J. 568 (1935).
151 In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); In re North Atlantic
& Gulf S.S. Co., 200 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Schilling v.
McAllister Bros., Inc., 310 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1962); Snively v. Loomis Coal Co., 69 F. 204
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1895); see Wood v. Guarantee Trust Co., 128 U.S. 416, 421 (1888); In re Pusey
& Jones Corp., 192 F. Supp. 233 (D. Del.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1961).
155 In re Chicago Express, Inc., 332 F.2d 276 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964);
In re Pusey & Jones Corp., 295 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1961); Wheeling Elec. Co. v. Mead, 177
F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1949); Kavanas v. Mead, 171 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1948) (holding that
six-month rule cannot enlarge wage priority granted by Bankruptcy Act).
156 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
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to railroad reorganizations under the Act.' 57 Former section
77B(b)(10), t58 relating to the reorganization of corporations other
than railroads, contained similar language, which was omitted
when section 77B was revised and re-enacted as Chapter X by the
Chandler Act of 1938. Nevertheless, the power of the court to
exercise all the powers it would have, had it appointed a receiver in
equity, 159 has been regarded as reserving a discretionary power in
the court to apply the six-month rule under Chapter X in appro-
priate cases.1 60 It has even been suggested that Chapter X evi-
dences such congressional concern for the survival of purely pri-
vate businesses that the reasons for excluding such entities from
the operation of the rule may no longer apply.161 On the other
hand, many practical difficulties have been envisioned in enlarging
the administration expense priority to embrace expenditures not
made under the scrutiny of the fiduciary and in introducing "an
undesirable imponderable into the already complicated techniques
of long term bond and mortgage financing."' 62 Moreover, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has opposed allowance of
priority for six-month claims, pointing out that the omission of the
language of former section 77B(b)(10) when the Chandler Act was
enacted was no mere oversight but a deliberate congressional
decision.' 63 In any event, even in reorganization proceedings to
which the six-month rule may apply, it yields, as does the general
priority for wages, 64 to the overriding force of the federal insol-
vency priority statute. 65
15 Southern Ry. v. Flournoy, 301 F.2d 847, 850 (4th Cir. 1962); see 5 W. COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY 1 77.21 (1964).
15' Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 1, 48 Stat. 914.
159 Bankruptcy Act § 115, 11 U.S.C. § 515 (1970).
160 In re Hallmark Medical Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1.973); Dudley v. Mealey,
147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945); see In re Chicago Express Co., 332
F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964); In re North Atlantic & Gulf S.S. Co.,
200 F. Supp. 818, 821 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Schilling v. McAllister Bros.,
Inc., 310 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1962). See also 6A W. COLLIER, Bankruptcy T 9.13[5] (1965);
Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations: Changes Effected by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1938).
161 T. FINLETrER, supra, note 140, at 383-84.
162 See In re Pusey & Jones Corp., 192 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 & n.13 (D. Del.), aff'd, 295
F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1961).
163 See In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 972, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); HousE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 74TH CONG., 2D SESS., ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889 CONTAINING
AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE NAT'L BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE 74 (Comm. Print 1936).
164 Cf. United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941) (equity receivership case; policy of
Congress to favor wages in straight bankruptcies signifies no change of position in cases still
governed by REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970)).
165 In re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 463 F.2d 73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
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2. The Commission's Proposals
a. Administrative Taxes. Taxes incurred after the filing of a
bankruptcy petition at present are treated as expenses of
administration 16 entitled to the highest priority, except as against
certain liens that are neither invalidated nor postponed in
bankruptcy.1 67 They are on an equal footing with the essential costs
and expenses of development, preservation, and distribution of the
debtor's assets. 168 The Commission's proposals exclude from the
administration expense priority certain taxes which are now arbi-
trarily included therein by application of the principle that a tax is
classifiable as a prebankruptcy claim only if on the date of bank-
ruptcy the facts necessary to compute the tax are known or
available. 169
Under the federal corporate income tax, and no doubt under
some state income and franchise taxes framed in similar terms, the
taxable year of the debtor is unbroken at the date of bankruptcy. 70
The trustee steps into the shoes of the bankrupt and, at least in the
view of the IRS, is required to file a return for the corporation for
the full taxable year.1 71 Since any income or profit the debtor may
have earned in the prebankruptcy portion of the year might be
cancelled through later losses, no fixed or determinable tax li-
The contrary view expressed in 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 157, at 77.21, is not supported by
the referee's decision on which it relies (In re Missouri Pac. R.R., CCH BANKR. L. REP. 3780
(E.D. Mo. 1935), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. J.P. Morgan & Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 85
F.2d 351 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 604 (1936)); that decision merely divided creditors
into classes and declared the ranking to be "provisional." See Plumb, supra note 146, at 46
n.242.
166 Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 153 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1946); In re Fonda,
J. & G. R.R., 126 F.2d 604, 606 (2d Cir. 1942).
167 See notes 26-37 and accompanying text supra.
168 In re Killoren, 119 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1941): In re Lambertville Rubber Co., 111 F.2d
45, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1940).
169 United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26, 33 (8th Cir. 1947); In re International Match
Corp., 79 F.2d 203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 652 (1935): 3A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
64.405[1] (1972).
170 Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-2(b), T.D. 6580, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 123; G.C.M. 12,207,
XII-2 CuM. BULL. 83, 85 (1933) (declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 71-498, 1971-2 CUM. BULL.
434). A declaration of obsolescence, where there has been no change in the law, may mean
only that the ruling is deemed "unnecessary because the issue has been covered by
regulations." Rev. Proc. 67-6, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 576, 577.
171 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(b)(4) (1958). Contra, In
re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1250, 1258-59 (S.D. Fla.), re,'d on other grounds, 332 F.
Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Town Crier Bottling
Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Mo. 1954). The trustee's obligation is discussed at length in
part I-B-I of Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Income
Tax Liabilities of the Estate and the Debtor, 72 MICH. L. REv. 935, 940 (1974).
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ability is considered to have been incurred until the year ends. 17 2
Therefore, any tax incurred for the period of that return appar-
ently occupies the priority position of an administration
expense, 173 even though the portion of the tax resulting from
transactions prior to bankruptcy is no more meritorious a claim
than the tax for a period that had ended before bankruptcy. Both
are wholly "unrelated to development, preservation or distribution
of the bankrupt's assets."' 7 4
The Commission proposes that estates in straight bankruptcy
be exempted from tax on income earned during the proceeding,
unless there ultimately proves to be a surplus for the debtor. 7 5
The Commission also proposes that the taxable period of the
debtor be terminated at the date of the petition and that the tax for
such period be allowed as a claim against the estate.176 Whatever
the merit of the exemption- proposal, which this writer has else-
172 Cf. Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1963); Ludwig Littauer &
Co., 37 B.T.A. 840, 843 (1938). However, the Fournier case, which denied the trustee's right
to obtain the refund resulting from the carryback of a net operating loss sustained by an
individual for the year in which bankruptcy occurred, so far as such loss was attributable to
the prebankruptcy portion of the year, has been overruled by the Supreme Court. Segal v.
Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). Although the amount of loss could not be determined until
the year ended after bankruptcy, the Supreme Court held that the inchoate right was a
contingent asset at the date of the petition and passed to the trustee under Bankruptcy Act §
70a(5) (11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970)). It could be argued, therefore, that any tax liability of
the corporation attributable to the same prior period, although not yet determinable, is a
prebankruptcy contingent claim provable under Bankruptcy Act §§ 57d and 63a(8) (11
U.S.C. §§ 93(d), 103(a)(8) (1970)). Gf Coclin Tobacco Co. v. Griswold, 408 F.2d 1338, 1341
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969).
173 Florida Nat'l Bank v. United States, 87 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1937).
174 Flanagan, The Determination and Payment of Federal Taxes in Bankruptcy, 47 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 81, 90 (1973); cf. In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted
sub nom. Otte v. United States, 414 U.S. 1156 (1974); In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc.,
336 F.2d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 1964). In support of the proposition that administration expenses
should generally be for such purposes, see Adair v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 303 U.S. 350, 360-61 (1938); cf. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968).
Harold Flanagan has scouted the applicability of the tripartite test to the classification of
taxes as administration expenses, on the grounds that "it is difficult to perceive how, except
in the most remote manner, taxes, other than franchise and some excise taxes, contribute to
the 'development, preservation or distribution of the bankruptcy assets' " and that it would
"be very difficult to force the income tax imposed on an estate under [Internal Revenue
Code] Section 6012 into one of these pigeon holes except by the most fanciful legal
imagination." Flanagan, supra. As a generalization, this statement seems incorrect, since it is
a basic premise of the taxation system that governmental services and protection contribute
to the production of a taxpayer's income, including any increments to a bankrupt estate. See
Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904). However, it is true that by no fanciful stretch
of the legal imagination could tax attributable to prebankruptcy income so qualify.
175 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 5-104(a).
176 Id. § 5-104(b).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:991
where criticized at some length,1 77 the related termination proposal
has the salutary effect of denying administration expense status to
the tax, if any, for the prebankruptcy portion of the year, since the
liability for the period closing at bankruptcy would be finally
determinable at that time.17 8 If the Commission's proposal to
exempt the estate from tax is not adopted, the priority anomaly
should nevertheless be dealt with by treating so much of the tax for
the year of bankruptcy as does not exceed the tax computed to the
date of the petition as a prebankruptcy claim, and only the balance,
if any, as an administration expense.1 79
A comparable distortion of the administration expense priority
occurs under present law upon conversion into cash of the value of
assets acquired by the trustee from either an individual or a
corporate bankrupt. The conversion results in taxable gains mea-
M See part I-C of Plumb, supra note 171, at 960.
17' Although the exemption and termination provisions would not be applicable in
reorganization and rehabilitation proceedings (PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcT §§ 7-315, 9-101),
this may be of no consequence, because a plan in such cases cannot be confirmed unless it
"provide[s] for the payment or securing" of all levels of priority claims, without distinction
between administration expenses and immediate prebankruptcy taxes. Id. §§ 7-303(2),
9-503(d)(3) (derived from but quite different in effect from Bankruptcy Act §§ 199, 77(e),
11 U.S.C. §§ 599, 205(e) (1970)). See notes 272-76 and accompanying text infra.
A somewhat similar problem, although not affecting priorities, exists in the case of an
individual bankrupt whose taxable year is also, at present, unbroken at the date of the
petition. Homer A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1294, 1298 (1971). But the consequences in an
individual case are different from those affecting a corporation because the individual
makes a return for the year of bankruptcy on his own behalf and the trustee is expected to
file as a distinct taxable entity, reporting only the postpetition income of the estate. Rev. Rul.
72-387, 1972-2 CUN. BULL 632; see part I-B-2 of Plumb, supra note 171, at 954. The tax, if
any, incurred by the individual for the full year, having become a fixed and determinable
liability only after bankruptcy, is then not allowable against the estate at all, but is collectible
only from the bankrupt's exempt and after-acquired property. In re Cooney, 35 Am. Bankr.
Rep. (n.s.) 247 (N.D.N.Y. 1938); see Frances M. Parkford, 45 B.T.A. 461 (1941), aff'd, 133
F.2d 249 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943). This result occurs even though the right
to the prebankruptcy earnings on which the individual is taxed passes to the trustee. In re
Aveni, 458 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1972); Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966). The
Commission's proposal to compute and allow the tax as of the date of bankruptcy would
ameliorate, but not resolve, this inequity. See part I-B of Plumb, supra note 171, at 990.
179 In this event, however, it would be desirable to divide the tax only for priority
purposes and not to treat the pre- and postbankruptcy segments as separate taxable periods.
If the estate later enjoys taxable income against which the loss carryovers of the debtor
might be offset, the division of the year would impose an unwarranted penalty, since each
such period would be considered a "taxable year," and the normal period of five "taxable
years" during which carryovers may be availed of would be shortened by one calendar year.
Treas. Reg. § 1.172-4(a)(2) (1956); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(1)-I(e)(3) (1960) (illustrating
similar effect upon nonbankruptcy reorganization). A like penalty would result if the trustee
sustained losses which could be carried back three taxable years to offset past profits of the
debtor corporation.
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sured by the debtor's basis for the assets.18 0 Gains from such
conversions, except in the probably unusual case where the sale by
the trustee realizes more than the value of the property at the date
of the petition, or where depreciation deductions during adminis-
tration have outpaced the decline in realizable value, are usually
"rooted in the prebankruptcy past" and the tax thereon is in no
sense a cost attributable to the administration of the estate. There
is no justification for favoring the tax on such appreciation over
wages and prebankruptcy taxes, or for placing such tax on a parity
with the trustee's expenses merely because the property is sold
after, rather than before, the date of the petition. There is likewise
no justification for the other extreme, which, as the Commission
proposes, wholly exempts gains on sales during administration,1 8 1
whereas realization of the same appreciation by the debtor before
the proceeding or by the debtor or a successor thereafter would
result in tax liability. I suggest, therefore, that gains on sales during
administration remain taxable, 182 but that the portion of the
estate's tax liability that is attributable thereto be classified, for
priority purposes, as a tax accruing as of the date of bankruptcy. 8 3
In contrast to annual taxes based on income, unemployment
180 United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1959); Homer A. Martin, 56
T.C. 1294, 1299 (1971); Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 301, 303.
,", Sales in straight bankruptcy are exempted as an incident to the exemption of the
trustee from all income taxes (PROPOSED BANKRUPTcY ACT § 5-104(a)), and sales in reorgani-
zation and rehabilitation proceedings are disregarded in determining the tax to which such-
estates would be subject. Id. 88 7-315(c), 9-101.
182 The Commission's proposal to exempt gains realized during the proceeding is
criticized in part I-C-4 of Plumb, supra note 171, at 977.
183 Proof of claim should not be required, however, since the transaction giving rise to
the tax occurs during bankruptcy-perhaps even after the time for claims has expired-and
is known to the trustee, who should have the obligation to inform the tax collector of it
rather than the reverse. Gf. In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
granted sub. norn. Otte v. United States, 414 U.S. 1156 (1974). As a matter of strict principle,
only the tax on the gain that would have been incurred on a sale at the date of the petition
should be treated as a prebankruptcy item, because the tax on any further increment in the
gain might be regarded as an incident to administration. To split the gain and the resulting
tax, however, would require the expense of an appraisal at the date of the petition, and the
chance that realizable values in a bankruptcy sale would exceed the fair market values at the
date of bankruptcy seem too remote to warrant imposing such a requirement. Nevertheless,
it may be appropriate to charge the administration with so much of the gain as equals
depreciation and depletion deductions taken on the property during administration, so far
as the deductions resulted in a tax benefit and thus reduced tax liabilities that would have
been chargeable as admifiistration expenses. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1245(a)(3),
1250(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-2(a)(7) (1965), T.D. 7141, 1971-2 CUMt. BULL. 304; Treas.
Reg. § 1.1250-2(d)(4) (1971) (imposing ordinary income tax on gains reflecting recovery of
prior depredation deductions, but only so far as tax benefit resulted therefrom).
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and old age taxes imposed on employers with respect to the
payment of wages have long been recognized as apportionable.
The tax attributable to wages paid by the debtor before bankruptcy
is deemed- a prebankruptcy obligation even though the taxable
period ends and the tax becomes payable during the
administration. 84 The tax attributable to wages paid for services
rendered to the bankrupt estate itself, however, is deemed an
expense of administration.185 The Commission, without disturbing
those principles, resolves a conflict of decisions concerning an
intermediate situation by providing that employment taxes at-
tributable to wages earned before the petition but paid thereafter
from the estate should enjoy only the priority status of prebank-
ruptcy taxes,' 86 rather than the higher standing of administration
expenses accorded them by some courts.' 87 The mere technicality
that the tax on the payment of wages owed by the debtor is neither
incurred nor determinable until distribution to the employees by
the trustee is an inadequate reason for treating such a tax as an
expense of administration, outranking even the wages them-
selves,' 88 for the wages with respect to which the tax is imposed
"are unrelated to development, preservation or distribution of the
bankrupt's assets."'18 9 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the
proposal should go so far as to rank the trustee's tax liability
behind, rather than equal to, the prebankruptcy wage claims, with
the result that the full amount of the wage claims is payable before
any part of the tax on such payment.1 90 In any event, the proposal
ought to be modified to relieve the tax collector of the needless
formality of filing a proof of claim for such taxes, which must
necessarily be estimated arbitrarily on the assumption that the
184 In re John Horne Co., 220 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1955); Pomper v. United States, 196
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1952).
"Is Missouri v. Gleick, 135 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1943); In re Lambertville Rubber Co., III
F.2d 45, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1940).
186 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(c); see In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336
F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964).
187 Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201, 203 (9th Cir.), rehearing
denied, 246 F.2d 70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 857 (1957); United States v. Fogarty, 164
F.2d 26, 33 (8th Cir. 1947).
188 See In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub. nom.
Otte v. United States, 414 U.S. 1156 (1974).
189 In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 1964); see Plumb,
supra note 125, at 274-75. For a contrary view, see Flanagan, supra note 174, at 84-90.
190 In contrast, with respect to taxes imposed on the employees and required to be
withheld from wage payments by the trustee, the proposal would require pro rata payment
of wages and taxes. See note 196 and accompanying text infra.
1020 [Vol. 59:991
TAX RECOMMENDATIONS
maximum amount of wages will be paid,1 91 and which thus conveys
less useful information than will be obtainable by the trustee by
simple arithmetic when he actually pays the wages and incurs the
tax. 192
The Commission also resolves an existing three-way conflict of
authority on whether income and social security taxes, imposed on
the employees but required to be withheld from amounts paid to
them by* the trustee on account of prebarrkruptcy wages, rank as
administration expenses, 193 as prebankruptcy taxes,1 94 or as part of
the wage claims. 195 The Commission's proposal quite properly
requires the trustee to deduct the withholdings from his payments
on account of prebankruptcy wages and pay the amount over to
the tax collector, thus in effect giving the tax the same priority the
wage payments enjoy and dispensing with the need for filing a
claim therefor.196 Since the proposal is confined to wage withhold-
ings, the status of amounts which some laws require to be withheld
from interest and other payments, particularly those made to
certain nonresidents, 97 is left in doubt.
Although administration expenses, including taxes properly
attributable to the proceeding, generally rank on a parity among
themselves, 98 the law since 1952 has provided that, if a liquidating
bankruptcy supersedes a proceeding under another chapter of the
Bankruptcy Act and if there are insufficient funds for all adminis-
tration expenses, the expenses of the superseding bankruptcy shall
have priority over the unpaid expenses of the antecedent proceed-
ing, including, of course, any taxes incurred therein.' 99 Since the
19' In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1964). Although
the Second Circuit held proof of claim unnecessary with respect to withheld taxes, because it
viewed them as embraced in the employees' claims for the gross wages from which the tax is
to be deducted, the rationale of the decision would be inapplicable to the tax on the
employer, which was not involved in the case before the court. In re Freedomland, Inc., 480
F.2d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub. nom. Otte v. United States, 414 U.S. 1156
(1974).
192 See Plumb, supra note 125, at 279.
193 United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26, 30 (8th Cir. 1947).
194 In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 1964).
19:1 In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub. norn. Otte v.
United States, 414 U.S. 1156 (1974).
196 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(c); see Plumb, supra note 125, at 275, 278.
197 See, e.g., Wisconsin v.J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 1441-42.
19' See note 168 supra.
199 Bankruptcy Act § 64a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1970). Before Act of July 7, 1952
(ch. 579, § 19, 66 Stat. 426), expenses of both proceedings ranked equally. In re Killoren, 119
F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1941).
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Act refers only to prior proceedings under other chapters, it
appears that expenses and taxes incurred during a prior assign-
ment for creditors might be entitled to a prior lien or charge on
the property brought into the bankruptcy court.200 The Commis-
sion proposes to make clear that whether or not the superseded
proceeding is one under the Act, its unpaid expenses, including
taxes, are junior to those of the ultimate liquidation.20 '
b. Priorities Superior to Prebankruptcy Tax Claims. The Com-
mission proposes to raise the amount entitled to priority in certain
claims for compensation for services.20 2 The present $600 limita-
tion on the priority amount allowable is increased to $1,200 per
claimant, earned no more than three months before the earlier of
the date of filing the petition or the time of cessation of the
debtor's business.20 3 Fully as important in the long run as the
doubling of the amount of the priority is the further proposal for
adjustment of the amount, as often as biennially, by administrative
200 Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533, 538-39 (1903); see 3A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
64.102[2] (1967).
201 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 4-405(b), 4-403 Note 17.
202 Id. § 4-405(a)(3). A new priority class, composed of those dealing with the debtor in
the ordinary course of business or entering into transactions with him with the authorization
of the bankruptcy administrator in the interval between the time of an involuntary petition
and the order granting relief, is injected between administration expenses and wage claims.
Id. §§ 4-208(c), 4-405(a)(2). In addition, certain expenses of creditors, which in 1938 were
madejunior in priority to wage claims (note 109stpra), would be advanced to administration
expense status. Id. §§ 4-403(a)(2), (10).
203 The modification of the three-month rule would partially eliminate an inequity
existing under present law when bankruptcy supersedes a nonbankruptcy proceeding. For
example, if an assignment for creditors or receivership occurs on July 1, the employees
might be entitled under state law to priority for wages earned since April 1. But if
bankruptcy supervenes on September 28, their state law priority is voided as to wages
earned between April 1 and June 28. In re Ko-Ed Tavern, 129 F.2d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 1942);
Strom v. Peikes, 123 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1941); contra, Manly v. Hood, 37 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.
1930). This situation would arise even though the prior custody of the law may have been
just as effective as bankruptcy itself in precluding normal collection of payment for the
earlier services. Manly v. Hood, supra at 214. The proposal would relieve the employees of
the loss of priority if business ceases during the prior proceeding, but not if the business
continues-e.g., in receivershi p-although the employees' hands are just as surely tied with
respect to earlier wages unless their economic power is such that they are able to force
payment under the "necessity of payment" principle. Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197
U.S. 183, 187 (1905); Moore v. Donahoo, 217 F. 177, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 237
U.S. 706 (1915); United Statds v. Wisconsin Valley Trust Co., 233 F. Supp. 73, 79 (W.D. Wis.
1964); Plumb, supra note 146, at 48-50. At least those employees who are laid off by the
receiver may receive nothing under the "necessity" principle, yet their priority would be
eroded day by day as the receivership continues operations prior to bankruptcy. If, on the
other hand, a proceeding is initiated under one chapter of the Bankruptcy Act and later
converted to another, the three months would be measured from the initial filing of a
petition under the Act. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-312. In either event, wages earned
during the bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy proceeding would rank as administration expenses.
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action whenever there is an increase or decrease of ten percent or
more in the cost of living index since the last previous
adjustment,2 °4 so that we may not again see the figure frozen at an
unrealistic level for half a century.20 5
The priority at present is confined to wages and commissions
due to "workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling, or city
salesmen,"206 on the theory that protection is required only for
subordinate employees "who could not be expected to know any-
thing of the credit of their employer, but must accept a job as it
comes,"207 and "who generally have no substantial savings or other
reserves to fall back on in case of adversity and therefore cannot
afford to lose. 20 8 The Commission expands the priority to cover
claims for any form of compensation earned by any individual as
an employee or independent contractor,20 9 excluding only the
principal officers, directors, certain substantial stockholders, 210 and
members of the immediate family of any of them, 211 whose claims,
secured or unsecured, are not only denied priority but are subor-
dinated to general creditors. 21 2 No doubt the present section 64a(2)
is ambiguous, inadequate, and in need of revision, for the teacher
now denied priority as a "professional 213 may be as much in need
of protection in today's economy as the janitor, who has priority.
But are middle management employees, scientists, and engineers
employed by a bankrupt corporation-or, with due deference, its
lawyers and certified public accountants if unincorporated-en-
titled to or in need of priority over other creditors and a share in
the funds available for wage-earners, merely because they too
provide services rather than goods or money?
204 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 1-105. This is an oversimplified statement of the rule.
The details of its operation are set out in the Commission's notes to the proposed provision.
202 See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
200 Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1970).
07 In re Lawsam Elec. Co., 300 F. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
208 In re Estey, 6 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); see BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT 214.
See also Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152, 160 (1912);
Blessing v. Blanchard, 223 F. 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1915).
209 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(3).
210 The word used here is "affiliate," which is defined to include "a person who directly
or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 per cent or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor." Id. § 1-102(4).
21 A "member of the immediate family" means a "spouse, parent, spouse of a parent,
child, spouse of a child, brother, or sister, and includes a person in a step or adoptive
relationship." Id. § 1-102(32).
212 Id. § 4-406(a)(2). Although claims of close relatives of officers, etc., of a corporate
debtor are thus subordinated, claims of relatives of individuals are not. Id.
212 See In re Estey, 6 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
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The Commission concurs with present judicial opinion 214 that
vacation, severance, and sick leave pay are includible in the priority
as compensation for personal services.215 The Commission, how-
ever, creates a new priority level for "contributions to pension,
insurance, or similar employee benefit plans to the extent that the
claims arise from services rendered within one year before the date
of the petition or the cessation of the debtor's business, whichever
is earlier. '21 6 In order to avoid encroachment of obligations for
such contributions upon the funds available for direct payment of
compensation, the contribution claims are made a priority class
immediately behind such compensation. The amount of unpaid
contribution allowable with priority with respect to any individual
cannot exceed the lesser of (1) $300 or (2) the excess of $1,200 over
the amount paid on his priority claim for wages. 21 7
Under the proposed act, the bankruptcy system of priorities
for the first time is made applicable to corporate reorganizations of
the type now embraced in Chapter X.218 The federal insolvency
priority statute is superseded in such cases and, within specified
limitations, compensation and fringe benefit claims must be pro-
vided for.21 9 The intent of the Commission, however, is to pre-
clude application of the nonstatutory six-month rule, in any non-
railroad case,220 no matter how important to the public interest it
may seem to keep the enterprise functioning while it is en route to
the reorganization court.22' The bankruptcy system of priorities is
also extended to railroad reorganizations, but claims for current
operating expenses during the six months immediately preceding
214 See notes 114-17 and accompanying text supra.
215 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(3). The Commission's Note 3 to that provi-
sion states that "the three-month limitation is made inapplicable to severance and vacation
pay," since those benefits accrue over longer periods. In the proposed statute, however,
there is no express provision for relief from the limitation.
216 Id. § 4-405(a)(4). This provision overrules the cases cited in notes 112-13 supra.
217 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(4). It is unclear how the limitations are to be
applied when contributions to a plan are not allocated to particular employees or related to
their compensation-e.g., flat periodic payments, or payments based on production.
218 Cases now embraced in Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act would all be
covered by a unified procedure under Proposed Chapter VII.
219 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 7-303(2); see notes 272-76 and accompanying text
infra.
220 See note 155 supra. The Commission's Note 4 to Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-303
states its purpose to overrule In re Hallmark Medical Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.
1973), and Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945).
221 See note 152 and accompanying text supra. The Commission's view is that earlier
resort to the rehabilitation or reorganization provisions of the Act, under which priority
obligations may be created for continued operation, will suffice to maintain essential services.
BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT 219-20.
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the filing of the petition must be provided for,222 and claims for
personal injury to any person, whether occurring after or at any
time before the date of the petition, shall be paid as administration
expenses.223
c. Tax Claims Antedating Administration. Certain federal, state,
and local claims for prebankruptcy taxes occupy, under both
present law and the proposed revision, the priority level just below
the expanded preference for compensation and fringe benefits
claims. But the proposed tax priority is contracted to embrace only
the most current taxes. 24 The weasel words, "legally due and
owing,''225 are abandoned in favor of a forthright declaration of
the crucial date applicable to almost every conceivable form of
tax. 2
26
According to the proposal, taxes upon or measured by income,
for any period ending on or prior to the date of the petition, 27
enjoy priority over general creditors if the due date for filing the
return or the extended due date is within one year before the
222 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 9-503(d)(3). Because six months is expressly men-
tioned, the present flexibility of the courts to embrace more than six months' expenses in the
priority would apparently be denied. Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U.S. 257,
292-93 (1900); see In re Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 90 F.2d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 1937).
223 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 9-501. This section expands upon Bankruptcy Act
§ 77(n) (11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1970)), which now so treats claims for personal injuries to
employees, whether or not occurring within the preceding six months. Thompson v. Siratt,
95 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1938). But present law makes no such provision for injuries to
passengers and others. In re New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 92 F.2d 428 (2d Cir.
1937). Inexplicably omitted from the proposal are wrongful death claims, which are now
expressly covered in the case of employees. Also omitted from the proposal are the present
provisions for unsecured claims of sureties or supersedeas, appeal, attachment, and gar-
nishment bonds. See In re Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 90 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1937). The proposal
also omits the extension of the priority rule to federal equity receiverships. Carpenter v.
Wabash Ry., 309 U.S. 23 (1940). The two last-mentioned of these neglected provisions may
perhaps have outlived their usefulness. Like present law the proposal fails as well to provide
similar priority for persons injured by intrastate railroads, which will be subject to proposed
Chapter VII (now Chapter X) rather than to the railroad reorganization provisions. See
Augus v. Stichman, 273 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 988 (1960).
224 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(5).
225 See notes 126-31 and accompanying text supra.
226 "Taxes are either (1) capitation or poll taxes, (2) taxes on property, or (3) excise
taxes." I T. COOLEY, TAXATION § 38 (4th ed. 1924). The proposal fails to refer to capitation
or poll taxes, which may still be levied even though not made a condition to voting. See
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668-69 (1966). Property taxes include
both ad valorem taxes and specific taxes, that is, by the number, weight, size, etc., of certain
objects owned, without reference to value. I T. COOLEY, supra at § 52. The proposal
mentions only ad valorem taxes. Neither poll taxes nor specific property taxes, however,
appear to be so significant that the resulting denial of priority for them would be material.
227 For a discussion of the status of taxes for periods ending thereafter, see notes
170-79 and accompanying text supra.
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petition or has not yet arrived.2 8 For example, if an individual
becomes bankrupt on March 1, 1975, the priority extends to the
taxes for 1973, the return for which is due April 15, 1974, less than
a year before bankruptcy, and to those for 1974, the return for
which is not due until after bankruptcy, and for the short period
ending March 1, 1975.229 But if bankruptcy occurs on or after
April 16, 1975, and no extension of the time for filing the return
has been granted, only the taxes for 1974 and the short period in
1975 enjoy priority. For taxable years within that limited span-the
ones in which the debtor is least likely to have incurred an income
tax-the priority extends not only to taxes shown on the debtor's
return, if any, but to deficiencies subsequently determined and
assessed, whether before or after the filing of the petition.
For any earlier taxable year, the proposed act gives priority to
the original tax or deficiencies only in unusual circumstances, even
if the delay in assessment or collection is justifiable. If the tax has
been assessed, whether on an original return or as a deficiency, any
uncollected amount thereof is denied priority; it is of no avail to
the taxing government that a lien for such obligation has been duly
perfected since statutory tax liens are wholly invalidated by the
proposed legislation. 230 Even if the tax has not been assessed
because the debtor's failure to file a return or his filing of a false or
fraudulent return made prompt detection of his tax delinquency
more difficult, or if the amount of tax shown on the debtor's
return is erroneous and the tax collector is restrained by law from
assessing and collecting the deficiency by normal procedures until
the debtor is afforded an opportunity to contest his liability, the tax
priority nevertheless is denied. The 1966 legislation, which attempt-
ed to accommodate the needs of practical tax administation by
maintaining the government's priority where the delay is thus
justified,2 3' was unquestionably ineptly drafted and in need of
228 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(5)(A).
229 Under present law, the taxable year would not end at bankruptcy, and no part of
the tax for 1975 would be provable against the estate. Instead, the entire tax for the year
would be a postbankruptcy obligation, collectible only from the exempt and after-acquired
property of the debtor, even though the taxed income had passed to the trustee. The
Commission's proposal makes the tax computed on the income of the short period an
allowable claim. See note 178 supra.
211 See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra. Even if the tax had been collected, it
would be recoverable by the trustee if (1) the assessment had first given rise to a lien and (2)
collection had occurred within three months before bankruptcy, so the period in which the
Government is permitted to collect its tax without loss of priority is three months less than
superficially may appear. See notes 100-01 and accompanying text supra.
211 See notes 132-33 and accompanying text supra.
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amendment.2 32 But, instead of making the effort consistent with
their purpose to make those provisions understandable and ration-
ally workable, the Commission wholly abandons the accommoda-
tions that ultimately won congressional approval of the 1966 re-
forms in the face of nearly two decades of bitter Treasury
opposition.3 3
In proposing what amounts to a "no-fault" standard for deny-
ing the priority of noncurrent tax liabilities, the Commission states,
in effect, that the tax collector is no more meritorious a creditor
than those who provide the unsecured credit that keeps the busi-
ness going. As the Commission's Chairman Marsh earlier wrote:
Should tax claims be granted priority in bankruptcy? Does
the traditional rule which has granted priority to all tax claims, at
least over all general, non-priority creditors, rest upon anything
more than a naked assertion of power based upon the fact that
this particular creditor happens to be writing, the rules of dis-
tribution? It is possible that in a simpler day the priority given to
tax claims in insolvency proceedings was of some real conse-
quence in gathering together enough funds to keep the govern-
ment running. There can be no doubt today that whatever
amount the government is able to collect as a result of such a
priority over what it would receive without it is insignificant; its
sacrifice would go completely unnoticed in the vast federal
bureaucracy. It is difficult to see how the government, absent a
plea of necessity, has any equities superior to the other creditors
of an insolvent.2 34
Chairman Marsh anticipates the argument that, if the dollars
involved are so insignificant as to mean little to the government, it
is equally true that little is added to the typically small recovery of
each creditor. He responds that it is important that the govern-
ment both be fair and appear to be fair in its dealings with its
citizens, and that, "[i]f there is no equitable basis for the
Government's claiming such a priority, its assertion is viewed
merely as an exercise of arbitrary power; [hence,] to say that any
one of the victims is really hurt very little is irrelevant.
2 35
232 See Marsh, supra note 39, at 689-97. For suggested statutory amendments to deal
with the problem areas, see Plumb, Federal Tax Liens and Priorities in Bankruptcy-Recent
Developments, 43 REF. J. 37, 43-46 (1969).
233 See notes 132-33 and accompanying text supra.
234 Marsh, supra note 39, at 729 (footnote omitted). The footnote cites 1966 statistics
indicating that tax claims probably received substantially less than $43,000,000 in bank-
ruptcy liquidations, despite their liens, and priorities.
235 Marsh, supra note 39, at 729-30: see H.R. REP. No. 687, supra note 128, at 4. The
House Judiciary Committee stated that it had received "hundreds of letters from business
firms all over the country complaining about [the] situation" (Marsh, supra note 39, at 730
10271974]
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A proponent of the original American Bar Association rec-
ommendation, to which the Commission's proposal is a throw-
back, 236 cited a reason why, at least in many business bankruptcies,
the federal tax priority results in inequities:
General unsecured creditors in most cases have supplied the
bankrupt with goods and funds during the period immediately
prior to bankruptcy, and what remains of such goods and funds
usually constitutes the bulk of the assets of the bankrupt. The
result is that new, general, and unsecured creditors often furnish
the wherewithal out of which are paid the expenses of adminis-
tration and taxes, and it frequently happens that tax claims
disclose old and large liabilities of which the general unsecured
creditor had no knowledge or means of ascertaining.2 37
Although I am not prepared to concede the validity of that
argument in support of the Commission's proposal to invalidate
tax liens that have been a matter of record for three months or
more before bankruptcy, 238 it is persuasive as applied to tax
liabilities which, for whatever good reason, remain undetermined
and undiscoverable by those extending credit.
A dilemma results, however, from the policy tension between
priority and dischargeability of tax claims. If a tax claim is denied
priority, the probability that it will not be paid out of the estate is
enhanced; if the same claim is nondischargeable, the consequence
of its lack of priority is to enlarge the overhanging burden of debt
that will impede the debtor's "fresh start. '239 Accordingly, the 1966
legislation preserved the Government's priority for every tax for
which Congress for any reason denied the debtor a discharge. 240
The Commission partially severs the priority and discharge issues
by relieving innocent creditors of the burden of the Government's
priority for noncurrent taxes for which the debtor filed a fraudu-
n.105) which was thereafter only ineffectually remedied by the 1966 legislation. Marsh views
these complaints as evidence of "a widespread and deep-seated resentment in the business
community at the government's claiming the lion's share of every bankrupt estate." Marsh,
supra note 39, at 730.
236 See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
237 Olive, sup a note 90, at 6. With less restraint, a referee has expressed the view that
"[t]axing authorities and collectors are not responsible for a dollar's worth of goods on any
bankrupt's shelves or for one single fixture in his store and every penny paid in tax priorities
is at the expense of the general creditors." In re Raflowitz, 43 Am. Bankr. Rep. (n.s.) 358,
361 (D. Conn. 1940), rez'd, 37 F. Supp. 202 (D. Conn. 1941).
238 See notes 93-94 -and accompanying text supra.
239 Moore & Tone, supra note 90, at 704.
21" Act ofJuly 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-496, 80 Stat. 27 (1966), amending Bankruptcy Act
§§ 17a(1), 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. §§ 35(a)(1), 104(a)(4) (1964) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 35(a)(1),
104(a)(4) (1970)).
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lent return or no'return, but retaining the denial of a discharge in
such cases. The burden of the debtor's misconduct or default is
thus placed upon the debtor and the Government rather than
upon the creditors. But, in further relieving the unknowing cred-
itors of the existing priority consequences of a debtor's nonfraudu-
lent understatement of his tax liability, the Commission felt obliged
also to grant the debtor a discharge. 24' There are nevertheless very
persuasive reasons why Congress may be unwilling to follow the
Commission's lead in permitting even a nonfraudulent taxpayer,
by declaring bankruptcy as early as a year and a day after filing his
return, to escape liability for the tax he failed to disclose on his
return.242 Unfortunately for innocent creditors, unaware of the tax
liabilities that may accumulate while the controversy remains unre-
solved, the reasons for denying discharge in such circumstances are
necessarily also reasons against denying the priority of the claim
unless Congress is prepared to sever the issues completely, in effect
penalizing the nonfraudulent debtor for contesting his tax liability,
by denying discharge thereof yet making priority funds in his
estate unavailable for its satisfaction.
In one circumstance, the Commission's concern for the inno-
cent creditors who extend credit in ignorance of the debtor's tax
liabilities is overcome by a greater concern for the debtor himself.
Under its general power to compromise tax liabilities,243 the Gov-
ernment may enter into a deferred payment agreement with a
hard-pressed taxpayer who appears able to work himself out of his
difficulties if given time.244 In connection therewith it also may
refrain from filing notice of its lien or may release a lien already
filed, in order that the taxpayer who is conscientiously meeting his
deferred payments may deal freely with his property and obtain
credit, unhampered by a notice of lien filed against all his assets.
One of the objections raised by the Treasury against the 1966
legislation was that it would make the tax collector reluctant to
enter into such arrangements, and would force him to "crack
down" on the distressed taxpayer by seizing his home or other
241 See text accompanying note 403 infra.
242 See text accompanying notes 392-95 & 439-43 infra.
243 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7122.
244 In general, federal law limits extensions of the time for payments of income tax to
six months from the due date, in the case of tax shown on the return (INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 6161(a)(1)) and to 18 months in the case of deficiencies (id. § 6161(b)(1)); further
extensions, however, limited only by the discretion of the tax collector, may be granted once
the collection process begins. United States v. Wolper, 86 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1936); Treas.
Reg. § 301.6343-1(a)(2), T.D. 7180, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 386, 393.
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assets, because if bankruptcy occurred after the then three-year
limitation period, the Government would lose its priority and
suffer discharge of the liability for the deferred payments.
2 45
Although the objection went unheeded by Congress at the time,
the proposed shortening of the limitation on priority and nondis-
chargeability to one year moved the Commission to propose an
exception whereby, if an extension of the time for payment of any
form of tax has been granted, the priority and nondischargeability
of the tax claim is preserved with respect to any installments that,
under the terms of the extension, were payable after or within one
year before the date of the petition.146 Although such considera-
tion for the debtor is commendable,2 47 the proposal partially ne-
gates the intended protection for creditors, since it exposes them to
priority claims which may include taxes for a number of years past
and for which there may be no recorded notice of lien. It is
impossible, of course, to satisfy everyone in a bankruptcy situation
in which someone necessarily must lose. But a better balancing of
the equities of the parties might be achieved if, while making the
deferred tax nondischargeable as proposed and thus assuring the
tax collector that the taxpayer cannot walk away from the ar-
rangement made for his accommodation, priority were neverthe-
less denied in the absence of public notice of the liability. In this
way, creditors would be protected against an undue accumulation
of taxes of which they had no warning. Although this suggestion
could result in a greater ultimate burden on the debtor if bank-
ruptcy ensues and the loss of priority causes less of the tax to be
collectible from the estate, it is not an unfair burden to impose
when the delay in collection and the nonfiling of the lien are for
the accommodation of the debtor and at his request. If the
Government's priority is to be preserved in such cases, considera-
tion should be given to providing for filing notice of the payment
arrangement, which would warn creditors but which would not
have the effect of a filed notice of lien except as against the trustee
if bankruptcy ensues.2 48
245 H.R. REP. No. 687, supra note 128, at 6 (Treasury Department statement).
246 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(5)(F); see BANKRUPTCY COMMN'N REPORT 216.
247 According to Marsh,
[a]ny rule denying priority to tax claims purely upon the basis of age tends to put
pressure on the Internal Revenue Service to "crack down" on delinquent taxpayers,
regardless of their degree of fault. Surely, any humanity which may have insinuated
itself into the heartless process of tax collection is not something to be discouraged.
Marsh, supra note 39, at 730.
248 This was proposed by the Treasury Department and the Senate Finance Committee
as an amendment to one of the 1966 bankruptcy bills. S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
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The Commission's proposal perpetuates a serious aberration
in the interpretation of present law. If a taxpayer, on the road to
bankruptcy, suffers a net operating loss, the loss may in general be
carried back to offset income reported in the three preceding
years.2 49 In order to provide needed funds without delay to one
who has suffered such a loss, the Internal Revenue Code permits
the taxpayer to file an application for a tentative refund of the tax,
overpayment for the prior year resulting from application of the
carryback. Furthermore, it requires that the refund be paid within
ninety days, with a minimum of checking for obvious errors,
subject to full examination at a later date.2 50 If, for example, a loss
for 1972 is carried back to 1969 and a tentative refund is allowed
on June 1, 1973, a later audit of the 1972 return may result in
reduction of the claimed loss and consequent liability to repay part
of the refund allowed for 1969. In the Fifth Circuit's view, under
the present Bankruptcy Act the liability is a tax "legally due and
owing" for 1969, and was already more than three years old on the
day the tentative refund was made. Hence it would be a discharge-
able and nonpriority claim, even if bankruptcy occurred im-
mediately, despite the fact that until that moment the tax for 1969
was not underpaid at all.25 ' A district court in New York has
disagreed on the ground that the tax could not have become
"legally due and owing" until the events giving rise to the liability
occurred.252 But the ground would be cut from under the latter
deciision by the proposed abandonment of the "legally due and
owing" phraseology. Since the liability is one for a tax "upon or
measured by income" for the year to which the loss was carried
back, it would be difficult to argue that the liability to repay the
excessive carryback refund is not a dischargeable nonpriority claim
from the moment of its birth. The proposal should be amended to
make clear that in such a case the one year limitation is measured
from the date of the refund which for the first time results in the
debtor's liability to repay.
6, 13 (1966). It was apparently acceptable in principle to at least one representative of the
National Bankruptcy Conference, Professor MacLachlan. See Hearings on S. 976 (H.R. 3438)
and S. 1912 (H.R. 136) Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 54 (1965).
But it fell with the defeat of the rest of the Treasury Department substitute for the Judiciary
Committee's bills. See Plumb, supra note 125, at 271.
249 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(1)(A)(i).
250 Id. § 6411.
251 In re Able Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 425 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1970); see Plumb,
Federal Tax Priorities in Bankruptcy and Insoh,ency, 78 CoN. L.J. 309, 312 (1973).
252 In re Laytan Jewelers, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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The one-year cutoff of the tax priority is applied, with some
variations, to taxes other than those imposed upon or measured by
income. In the case of claims for ad valorem property taxes, priority
over general claims is allowed if the tax was last payable without
penalty within one year before the date of the petition.253 How-
ever, in view of the widespread, if not universal, practice of
impressing a lien for ad valorem taxes which would normally attach
automatically long before a year after the last day for payment
without penalty, and in view of the proposal to recognize statutory
liens for ad valorem taxes,254 only in rare cases would such a tax,
regardless of age, not qualify for either lien or priority status.
Under the Commission's proposal, customs duties and excises,
other than excises measured by income or by wages paid, enjoy
priority only to the extent that they are imposed on transactions
occurring within one year prior to the date of the petition, even
though the reporting of liability might be required on a return due
less than a year before the petition. 255 Employment taxes-i.e.,
those imposed on the debtor as an employer-based on wages
earned before the date of the petition enjoy priority over general
claims only if the return is required to be filed within one year
prior to the petition or thereafter.256 On the other hand, income
and social security taxes imposed on the employee but required to
be withheld by the debtor from wages paid before bankruptcy
enjoy priority, as tax claims, over general creditors of the debtor,
no matter how many years' accumulation of such claims there may
be. 57 The proposal thus conforms with the present law. 25 8 It
253 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(5)(B). Whereas the income and employment
tax priority provisions (id. §§ 4-405(a)(5)(A) & (D)) use the phrase "within one year prior to
the petition or thereafter" (emphasis added), the ad valorem tax provision does not. Its
omission of the words "or thereafter" is disturbing. When a property tax is incurred before
bankruptcy, and hence should not rank as an administration expense, the fact that payment
without penalty is still permissible at the date of the petition should not cause it to lose even
the priority that a somewhat older claim for such a tax would enjoy.
254 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-606(a)(2); see note 81 supra.
255 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(5)(E).
256 Id. §§ 4-405(a)(5)(D), 4-405(c). This priority applies regardless of whether the wages
are paid or unpaid and whether the tax is incurred before or after the date of the petition.
The proposed change in the law respecting the tax on wages earned before but paid during
the proceeding is discussed in notes 186-92 and accompanying text supra.
257 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(5)(C). For a discussion of the proposed
treatment of tax withholdings from wages earned before but paid during the proceeding,
see notes 193-97 and accompanying text supra.
258 Bankruptcy Act §§ 17a(i)(e), 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. §§ 35(a)(l)(e), 104(a)(4) (1970). The
unlimited priority and nondischargeability of liabilities for taxes "which the bankrupt has
collected or withheld from others" is construed to include not only the employer's own
liability but also the 100% "penalty" imposed by § 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code on the
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reflects the peculiar sanctity of withheld taxes, which are viewed as
trust funds,2 59 although in fact the question of priority would arise
only if the debtor had dissipated the trust.26 ' The debtor's default
and dissipation of the trust fund are much more readily subject to
prompt detection and remedial action by the tax collector than, for
example, his underpayment of income taxes;261 unpaid withhold-
ings are more likely than stale income taxes to be a heavy burden
on general creditors in bankruptcy. 262 It therefore seems difficult
to justify exempting such claims from the proposed one-year
limitation on priority, if the limitation is supportable at all.
Proposed changes in the law respecting partnership bankrupt-
cies also affect priorities. Partnerships occupy a dual status under
the federal tax law as well as under any state or local tax laws cast
in similar terms. For certain purposes, they are treated as business
entities and are liable as such for withholding, social security, and
excise.taxes in the same manner as a corporate or individual
operator of the business would be.263 For federal income tax
purposes, however, a partnership is not taxed as such but is treated
in effect as a conduit: the partners are directly taxable on the
partnership's income in accordance with their distributive
shares.2 64 A partnership, as such, may become bankrupt, either
separately or jointly with one or more of its general partners.265
The present bankruptcy law adopts the rule of marshalling assets
by which the net proceeds of partnership property are first ap-
officer or other person responsible for the failure to protect the funds collected or withheld.
Westenburg v. United State, 285 F. Supp. 915 (D. Ariz. 1968); Sherwood v. United States,
228 F. Supp. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); In re Serignese, 214 F. Supp. 917 (D. Conn. 1963), off d
siib nom. Goring v. United States, 330 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1964). The Commission similarly
construes its proposal. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-406 Note 6.
259 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7501(a).
260 If the fund is traceable, the Government can claim it as its own property, free of the
bankruptcy administration. In re States Motors, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Mich. 1958). If
not, the claim is viewed for priority purposes as a tax liability of the employer. United States
v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 513-16 (1942); In re Gregory Mobile Homes, Inc., 347 F. Supp.
528 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
2" See Moore & Tone, supra note 90, at 703-04, suggesting that the period for which
priority claims should be allowed to accumulate should be shortest for withheld taxes, which
are simple to compute, required to be paid promptly, and rarely disputable, while a longer
period should be allowed for income taxes, which involve complexities in determination.
262 See Marsh, supra note 39, at 694; ef. In re Gregory Mobile Homes, Inc., 72-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9564 (M.D. Ga.), rev'd, 347 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
263 Adler v. Nicholas, 166 F.2d 674, 679 (10th Cir. 1948).
264 United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441, 448 (1973); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 701-04.
265 Bankruptcy Act § 5a, I1 U.S.C. § 23(a) (1970). To the same effect, see PROPOSED
BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 1-102(34), 4-201, 4-204, 4-206, 4-305.
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propriated to partnership debts, and the net proceeds of individual
assets are applied first to individual debts of the members of the
partnership. 266 If a business tax is duly assessed against the part-
nership as such before bankruptcy, and notice of lien is duly filed,
such tax will enjoy lien status in the estates of both the partnership
and its members, since the members are liable for partnership
debts and the marshalling rule does not affect liens. 67 However, if
no lien is perfected, the tax is collectible as either a priority or a
general claim against the partnership estate, but is collectible from
the individual estates only in subordination to all their personal
general creditors. On the other hand, the income tax incurred by
the individual partners on partnership income, which may have
been retained in the partnership or expended for its benefit, enjoys
priority or general status only in the members' personal estates
and, if not collectible from them, is subordinated in the partner-
ship estate to all partnership debts.2 68
The Commission proposal substantially modifies those rules in
both respects. On the one hand, the marshalling rule is altered, as
has long been urged,269 so that partnership creditors, including
claimants for taxes which are partnership debts, share in the assets
of the individual estates in the same manner as individual cred-
itors, and are no longer subordinated in such assets. 70 On the
other hand, while the generally superior rights of partnership
creditors in assets of the partnership continue, any income tax
liability incurred at the individual level that is fairly apportionable
to a partner's taxable share of partnership earnings not withdrawn
by him before bankruptcy is classified as a partnership obligation.
As a result, it is collectible from partnership, as well as individual,
assets, with the priority, if any, to which the age of the liability
entitles it, but in any event without being subordinated to firm
creditors.27 '
In the case of railroad and corporate reorganizations under
266 Bankruptcy Act § 5g, 11 U.S.C. § 23(g) (1970). This is in accord with the general
rules expressed in UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 40(h)-(i).
267 In re Crockett, 150 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
268 United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408 (1925).
269 J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 122, at 423-25; Kennedy, A New Deal for Partnership
Bankruptcy, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 610, 630-32 (1960) (reporting efforts of National Bankruptcy
Conference to change rule).
270 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(f). Principles of marshalling would no doubt
require that such tax claims first exhaust partnership assets.
271 Id. § 5-104(d). This provision reinstates, so far as it may have been impaired by the
Kaufman decision (United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408 (1925)) the equitable rule of In re
Brezin, 297 F. 300, 306-07 (D.N.J. 1924).
1034 [Vol. 59:991
TAX RECOMMENDATIONS
the Bankruptcy-Act, the prescription of present law that no plan
shall be confirmed which does not provide for full payment of
federal taxes and customs duties, unless the Treasury agrees to
accept a lesser amount, 272 is replaced by a requirement that provi-
sion be made "for the payment or securing" of those claims entitled
to priority under the foregoing proposed rules. 273 Thus, the
Treasury's existing veto power is largely abrogated since, in gen-
eral, taxes more than a year old need not be provided for unless
there is an equity remaining for them. In addition, even if the
estate is insolvent, it is the declared intention of the Commission
that the ancient insolvency priority statute274 no longer be applica-
ble in such reorganizations,275 so that even those federal claims
entitled to priority need only be properly secured, but need not
necessarily be paid first in time, as under present law.276
d. Interest on Taxes. As a general rule, interest is not recover-
able in bankruptcy beyond the date of the petition, whether the
claim is for a private debt 277 or for a tax.278 This rule applies in
reorganization and rehabilitation proceedings279 as well as in
straight bankruptcy. It is not completely accurate, however, to say
that interest stops running at the date of the petition, because
interest accruing afterward is collectible from the debtor himself if
272 See notes 149-50 and accompanying text supra.
273 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 7-303(2), 9-503(d)(3). State and local taxes, so far as
they are entitled to priority, are thus for the first time brought within the protection of this
requirement.
274 REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
275 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 7-303 Note 4. The past reluctance of the courts to
imply amendments to the insolvency priority statute from amendments to related laws
warns, however, that the intention ought to be spelled out in the statute itself, or in
unmistakable legislative history. See United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941); H.B.
Agsten & Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust & Say. Bank, 388 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968). But cf. United States v. Gargill, 218 F.2d 556, 558-59 (1st
Cir. 1955).
27' United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322 (1970). See notes 141-48 and accompanying text
supra.
277 Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911).
278 City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328 (1949). The rule applies even when the tax
is secured by a perfected general lien. In re Kerber Packing Co., 276 F.2d 245 (7th Cir.
1960); United States v. Bass, 271 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Harrington, 269
F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1959); Rev. Rul. 68-574, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 595. Interest stops even if the
Government has made a levy, but has not collected, before bankruptcy. In re Quakertown
Shopping Center, Inc., 366 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 1966).
279 United States v. Edens, 189 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1951) (involving a Chapter X
proceeding); United States v. General Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1951)
(involving a Chapter XI proceeding), both aff'd, 342 U.S. 912 (1952); In re Tennessee Cent.
Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 73 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972) (involving a railroad reorganization proceeding).
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the underlying obligation is not discharged, 80 and is collectible
from the value of the specific security in excess of the principal of
the debt.2 1 Since the relief from postpetition interest is granted
not out of compassion for the debtor 28 2 but to prevent creditors
from profiting or suffering loss through the effect of interest
accruing during a delay that is "the act of the law, 28 3 such interest
may be allowed out of assets of the estate when there is a surplus
over the principal of allowed claims.2 8 4 The Commission proposal,
in effect, confirms this rule by providing that interest on allowed
claims, other than subordinate claims, 2 5 shall be paid next after
general nonpriority claims.28 6
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has said, in a considered
dictum, that interest is allowable on those taxes that are incurred
during the proceeding and constitute administration expenses.
2 87
280 Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964); Hugh H. Eby Co. v. United States,
456 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1972); In re Johnson Elec. Corp., 442 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1971).
281 In re Black Ranches, Inc., 362 F.2d 8, 15 (8th Cir. 1966); In re Macomb Trailer
Coach, Inc., 200 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 958 (1953); see Vanston Bond-
holders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 164 (1946) (compound interest denied in
bankruptcy even when security would cover it; simple interest allowed only if security worth
more than sum of principal and interest due (emphasis added)). The Commission, although
stating perversely that 'judicial rules concerning postpetition interest and penalties are not
disturbed," indicates its disapproval of these decisions (which it fails to cite) by stating the
existing rule to be that "[p]ostpetition interest is not allowable on any claim, whether or not
dischargeable or fully secured by an indefeasible lien." PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-506
Note 4. The Commission cites City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328 (1949), and Sword
Line v. Industrial Comm'r, 212 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 830 (1954), neither
of which involved a secured claim, although the Sword Line court, without expressing an
opinion even by dictum, did raise the question whether "in pursuance of" an overriding
policy the Court may ultimately think it not desirable to allow any [exceptions] at all." 212
F.2d at 869. The principle of the Black Ranches and Macomb cases, supra, has not been
extended by the courts to cases where a tax creditor has a general lien on all the debtor's
property. See note 278 supra.
282 See Bruning v. United States, 317 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1963), qff'd 376 U.S. 358
(1964).
283 American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 266 (1914).
284 Brown v. Leo, 34 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1929); Johnson v. Norris, 190 F. 459 (5th Cir.
1911); see American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 266-67
(1914).
282 See notes 299-302 and accompanying text infra.
288 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(8). Although the proposed provision states
generally that "interest on claims" shall occupy this position in the hierarchy of distribution,
it is evident that only postpetition interest is meant to be thus subordinated. See id. § 4-405
Note 6. Prepetition interest would itself be a claim, since "claims" are determined as of the
date of the petition. Id. § 4-403(b).
287 In Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 682-90 (1966), the Court concluded that
"[a] tax incurred within any one of these three periods [the pre-arrangement period, the
period of an attempted Chapter X1 arrangement, and the liquidating bankruptcy period]
would, we think, be entitled to bear interest against the bankrupt estate until, but not
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Although the Commission's purpose with respect to such interest is
unclear, it appears that interest on such taxes continues to be
allowable at the expense of other creditors. 28 8 Yet, as an earlier
court of appeals opinion to the contrary had aptly said,
[w]hether the tax accrued before bankruptcy or subsequent
thereto, the evil propagated by continually accruing interest
remains the same. In neither case is it logical to charge a
bankrupt estate a fee for the use of money-when it is the force of
law which prevents the return of the principal to the creditor,
rather than the desire of the debtor to retain its use. 28 9
Congress should consider whether to extend the subordination of
interest to claims incurred during the proceeding, other than on
funds borrowed for the purposes of -administration.29 ° On the
other hand, since there may be cases where payment of taxes is
delayed with no better excuse than that the tax morrey has been
put to work for the rehabilitation of the debtor and the enhance-
ment of the return to the creditors, it might be advisable to give the
court discretion to allow interest without subordination.291
e. Tax Penalties. Penalties which accrue on taxes and other
governmental claims before the filing of the petition have long
been expressly disallowed in bankruptcy, except to the extent that
they compensate for actual pecuniary losses sustained.292 This
beyond, the close of the period in which it was incurred." Id. at 686. That conclusion is
dictum for present purposes since the tax was incurred during the arrangement period, but
the interest accrued only in the liquidating period, and was disallowed.
288 The ambiguity of the Commission's position may be due to a typographical error in
the proposed bill. The interest that is proposed to be subordinated to general claims
is "interest on claims allowed under section 4-402(b)." PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT
§ 4-405(a)(8). Since § 4-402(b) relates to the allowance of secured and partially secured
claims, it is probable that the intended reference is to § 4-403(b), relating to the allow-
ability of claims for other than administration expenses (which are dealt with in § 4-403(a)).
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 4-402(b), 4-403(a), (b).
289 United States v. Kalishman, 346 F.2d 514, 520 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1003 (1966).
290 See Plumb, supra note 125, at 284-85. It was said in Nicholas v. United States, 384
U.S. 678, 687 (1966), that the allowance of interest on debts incurred during the proceeding
promotes the availability of capital to the estate-an end which, however, could readily be
served by permitting the court or the administrator to approve contracts for the payment of
interest on funds borrowed by or on credit extended to the estate (cf. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY
ACT § 7-106), without subjecting the estate to interest on administrative tax claims.
291 Cf. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U:S. 678, 684-86 (1966); Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219
U.S. 339, 346 (1911); Beecher v. Leavenworth State Bank, 192 F.2d 10, 14 (9th Cir. 1951).
292 Bankruptcy Act § 57j, 11 U.S.C. § 930) (1970). Thus, fraud and delinquency
penalties are essentially punishments. and are disallowed, although to some extent they
compensate the government for enforcement costs. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
401 (1938). But the 100% "penalty" imposed by § 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code on a
corporate officer or other responsible person for failure to protect "trust funds" of taxes
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policy, which applies even to penalties secured by lien, 1 3 judg-
ment,2:9 4 or levy,2: 5 reflects the view that
[t]ax penalties are imposed at least in part as punitive measures
against persons who have been guilty of some default or wrong.
Enforcement of penalties against the estates of bankrupts, how-
ever, would serve not to punish the delinquent taxpayers, but
rather their entirely innocent creditors. 296
The penalty remains collectible against the bankrupt's exempt and
after-acquired assets297 unless the tax liability to which the penalty
relates is itself discharged.298
The Commission's proposal continues to protect the estate
against erosion by penalties not reflecting pecuniary loss, 299 and
extends that policy to embrace private claims in the nature of
penalties or forfeitures. 30 0 However, instead of disallowing penal
claims, whether governmental or private, the Commission proposal
subordinates them to all other claims, including postpetition in-
terest thereon, except certain rescission claims of security holders
and obligations to certain insiders, which 'stand equal to penalties
when there is available surplus in the estate. 301 The practical effect
withheld or collected is designed to make good a loss and is not disallowed. See note 258
supra. Nor is a "penalty" charge in the nature of interest to compensate for a prebankruptcy
delay in payment ordinarily denied. Compare New York v. Jersawit, 263 U.S. 493 (1924) with
United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304 (1924).
293 Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962).
291 In re Abramson, 210 F. 878 (2d Cir. 1914).
295 In re Brewster-Raymond Co., 344 F.2d 903, 910 (6th Cir. 1965).
296 Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1962) (footnote omitted). The same
disallowance applies in bankruptcy reorganizations. Simonson v. Granquist, supra, rev'g
United States v. Harris, 287 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1961) (involving a Chapter X proceeding); In
re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 463 F.2d 73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972) (involving a railroad
reorganization). Moreover, it applies to Chapter XI arrangements also. California State Bd.
of Equalization v. Goggin, 183 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950).
297 World Scope Publishers, Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965); Custom
Wood Prods., Inc. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 337 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
'9' Rev. Rul. 68-574, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 595.
299 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-406(a)(3). Although the Commission's Note 6 to that
section states that the "pecuniary loss" test is to continue to be applicable, it inexplicably
deletes the existing exception (note 292 supra) from the statutory text, and no definition of
"penalty" incorporating that test is provided.
300 This includes multiple, punitive, or exemplary damages. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY
ACT § 4-406(a)(3).
391 Although further stratification of claims is probably undesirable, particularly since
there may rarely be funds enough to reach this level, it may be questioned whether the
claims of defrauded security holders for rescission may not.be more meritorious than claims
designed to punish management misconduct, and whether such penalties, in turn, may not
be more deserving of satisfaction than the claims, at least, of those insiders who participated
in the wrongs.
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of the substitution of subordination for disallowance is that, if the
estate proves solvent, it enables collection of the penalty in the
bankruptcy proceeding itself rather than necessitating a separate
proceeding or, if the penalty is dischargeable, giving the debtor a
windfall through distribution of the surplus to him free of the
claim.302
The proposal codifies the interpretation -of present law as
disallowing or subordinating penalty claims "whether secured or
unsecured. ' 30 3 It further provides that any lien or trust securing a
subordinated penalty claim shall pass to the trustee for the benefit
of unsubordinated claimants. 30 4 While the lien preservation pro-
posal is in line with numerous existing provisions for preserving
voidable preferences, invalidated liens, and similar devices for the
benefit of the estate,30 5 it reverses the express determination by
Congress in 1966 that "[w]here a penalty [that is] not allowable...
is secured by a lien, the portion of the lien securing such penalty
shall not be eligible for preservation .... ,,306 The 1966 legislative
history is silent on the reason for this restriction, but some indica-
tion appears in the reports concerning identical language in a bill
that was passed in 1960 but vetoed by the President.30 7 Congress
then took the position that "a lien preserved for the estate benefits
only unsecured creditors" and that "there is no reason in the policy
of the act why junior lien holders should be bypassed in these
circumstances" 30s -i.e., where penalties are disallowed.
The policy reason now divined by the Commission for revers-
ing that position and extending the lien preservation rule to claims
for penalties is that the provision "is necessary to determine the
ranking of lien interests that in the application of [the provisions
302 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcT § 4-406 Note 4.
303 See notes 293-95 and accompanying text supra.
304 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-406(b).
305 Bankruptcy Act §§ 60b, 67a(3), 67c(2), 67d(6), 70(e)(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(b),
107(a)(3), 107(c)(2), 107(d)(6), 1 10(e)(2) (1970) (consolidated in PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcT
§ 4-610).
306 Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, 80 Stat. 268-69, adding Bankruptcy Act-
§ 67c(4), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(4) (1970).
307 H.R. 7242, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). The reports on that vetoed bill had been
relied upon by the Supreme Court as evidence of the meaning of the law even before
Congress finally succeeded in enacting it in 1966. United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266,
274-75 (1965). Reports on unenacted legislation that was later enacted in similar form
(without fresh explanation) have been relied upon in Portage Plastics Co. v. United States,
486 F.2d 632, 636-37 (7th Cir. 1973), and in Shores Realty Co. v. United States, 468 F.2d
572, 575 (5th Cir. 1972).
300 S. REP. No. 1871, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1960), quoting H.R. REP. No. 745, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959).
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subordinating certain claims even when secured] might otherwise
appear to be circular." 30 9 Circuity results, for example, if a duly
perfected lien for a penalty is superior to the rights of an interven-
ing purchaser, secured lender, or mechanic's lienor, whose rights
are effective against the trustee, who in turn takes free of the lien
for the penalty. By. preserving the lien, the trustee gains for the
benefit of general creditors a position superior to that of the
intervening party, without actually impairing the latter's relative
rights in the assets. But, if avoidance of circuity is the object, it
could equally be accomplished by invalidating the lien for the
penalty not only against the trustee but also against all liens that
are valid in bankruptcy, thereby "promoting" the position of valid
liens rather than enhancing the fund for unsecured creditors.310 A
better reason is required, therefore, for reversal of the 1966 policy
determination not to "bypass" junior liens-and purchasers-in
this particular circumstance.
In reaching its previous conclusion, Congress may have been
influenced by the fact that the claim for a nonpecuniary-loss
penalty, heretofore having been wholly disallowed in bankruptcy as
well as deprived of any lien status, takes nothing from the general
estate. In contrast, the invalidation of an attachment lien or an
unperfected tax lien leaves the underlying claim to be satisfied
from the general assets, while the liened property, if allowed to
pass to or be retained by the junior lienor'or purchaser free of the
invalidated lien, depletes the property from which the claim might
have been satisfied and the general estate exonerated pro tanto. It is
necessary in the latter type of case, therefore, to preserve the lien
in order to make the general estate whole and not give a windfall
to the junior lienor or purchaser at the expense of general
creditors.311 Under the Commission's proposal, of course, claims
for penalties become allowable, but the substance of their treat-
ment does not change: the penalty claimant, being subordinated,
will not share with general creditors but will be paid only if and
when they have been fully satisfied, with interest.
309 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-406 Note 7.
310 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 67c(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(2) (1970). If an invalidated lien is
not preserved for the benefit of the estate, the lien "shall be invalid as against all liens
indefeasible in bankruptcy, so as to have the effect of promoting liens indefeasible in
bankruptcy which would otherwise be subordinate to such invalidated lien." Id. That
provision (which does not appear in Proposed § 4-610) was enacted to avoid "the compound
confusion of circuity" in cases where no preservation action is taken. SENATE REPORT 7-8,
quoting HOUSE REPORT 6-7.
311 Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Staake, 202 U.S. 141 (1906); Egyptian Supply Co. v. Boyd,
117 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1941).
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The Commission's proposal for preservation of penalty liens
seems supportable, however, on another groun'd. Although no
depletion of the general estate is involved, there is nevertheless, if
preservation is not provided, a windfall to the intervening pur-
chaser or junior lienor, for whose benefit the statutory invalidation
of liens for penalties was never intended.31 2 A purchaser who
acquired property from the debtor or a lender who extended
secured credit to him when there was a lien already duly filed for
tax and penalty would have been subject thereto in the absence of
bankruptcy, and presumably took the lien into account in fixing
the price or assessing the risk to his security. Even if he failed,
through negligence or deception, to discover and allow for the lien,
whatever legal or equitable claim he may have to be made whole is
surely of no higher dignity than a general claim. He would have a
superior equity only if the invalidated lien, for want of filing or
otherwise, would have been ineffective against him in the absence
of bankruptcy. Inequity can be avoided in such situations by
construing the preservation statute-or, better, by making the
language or the legislative history clear beyond a doubt313 -to
place the trustee in no higher position against innocent third
parties than the holder of the invalidated lien would have
occupied.31 4
When a penalty is incurred in the course of the proceeding,
the general policy againt saddling the estate with penalties is held
inapplicable under present law. 315 Because the trustee or debtor in
312 The statutory invalidation of liens for penalties was never intended to benefit
intervening purchasers or junior lienors. The objective of making "as equitable a distribution
of assets as is consistent with the type of claims involved" (Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S.
38, 40 (1962)) is better served by "pro rata participation of all of the bankrupt's creditors"
(Egyptian Supply Co. v. Boyd, 117 F.2d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 1941)) than by giving the primary
benefit of the penalty disallowance to a lien creditor or purchaser.
313 For a discussion of some problems of construction of the present law, see Kennedy,
The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L.
REv. 1419, 1434-39 (1967).
314 In re Grave's Estate, 27 F. Supp. 717 (W.D. Ky. 1939); see Egyptian Supply Co. v.
Boyd, 117 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1941).
3" This is true regardless of whether the penalty results from the negligence or
misconduct of the trustee or debtor in possession or from the restraints imposed by the
proceeding itself. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 692-95 (1966) (failure of trustee to
file return, soon after taking office); Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57 (1939) (delinquency in
paying vehicle license fees where uncertain that estate would be sufficient to pay all expenses
entitled to share equally); In re Samuel Chapman, Inc., 394 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1968); In re
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 119 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1941); cf. California State Bd. of Equalization v.
Goggin, 183 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950). But cf. In re New York,
New Haven & Haftford R.R., 304 F. Supp. 1121, 1135 (D. Conn. 1969) (refusing to impose
delinquency penalties on taxes of railroad trustee where payment of tax had been deferred
by court order as only way to keep railroad operating in public interest).
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possession is acting for the benefit of the creditors and is subject to
their selection, and in some degree to their supervision,316 the
otherwise "innocent creditors" are made to suffer the punishment
which the law prescribes for the acts or defaults of their "agent,"
unless--if a trustee is involved-the circumstances of his act and his
financial condition are such that they can recoup their loss through
a surcharge. 1 7 The rationale is that if a tax is payable by the estate,
the Government should not "be denied the traditional and almost
universal method of enforcing" compliance.3 1 8 Yet the trustee or
debtor in possession is also an officer of the court,31 9 and "[t]he
control of the bankruptcy court should be a satisfactory guaranty
that tax law will be complied with as strictly as circum-
stances may permit. '320 Surely,
if it is unlawful to penalize the creditors for the [prebankruptcy]
delinquencies of the debtor, it is hard to see why they, should be
held accountable for an omission on the part of the trustee [or
debtor in possession] who in every act of his administration is
under the direct surveillance of the court, and is not subject to
the creditors' instructions.3 21
The Commission evidently proposes no relief in this regard,322
despite the fact that under its proposal the functions of the trustee
are, in most cases, to be performed by a government agency.
323
Congress ought to consider whether it would not be better to rely
3'6 Compare In re Samuel Chapman, Inc., 394 F.2d 340, 342 (2d Cir. 1968), with In re
Samuel Chapman, Inc., 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9209 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 270 F. Supp. 1021, 1023
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
317 See Delaware v. Irving Trust Co., 92 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 754
(1937); In re Samuel Chapman, Inc., 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9209 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 270 F.
Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 394 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1968). But see BANKRUPTCY CONM'N
REPORT 103-06 (discussion of- "myth of creditor control").
3s8 Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57, 61 (1939). See also Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S.
678, 694 (1966).
319 See Urban Properties Corp. v. Benson, Inc., 116 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1940).
0 Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1141, 1176 (1942).
321 Id. at 1167-68.
322 Proposed § 4-403(a) describes administration expenses as "claims," and § 4-406(a)(3)
subordinates "any claim" for a penalty, which action might indicate an intent to subordinate
penalties incurred during administration. But the operative section governing the order of
distribution, § 4-405, gives first priority to "administrative claims allowed under section
4-402(a)" without qualification (PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY Acr § 4-405(a)(1)), and reduces to
ninth place only "claims allowed under section 4-402(b) and subordinated in payment."
(Emphasis added.) If, as surmised (note 288 supra), the references to § 4-402 are erroneous
and are intended to be to § 4-403, only those penalties which fall under § 4-403(b), which
excludes administrative claims, would be subordinated.
323 Under Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 5-501, a federal agency, the United States
Bankruptcy Administration, would hereafter serve as trustee in liquidation cases unless the
creditors choose to elect a private trustee.
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upon the procedures and disciplinary powers of the bankruptcy
court, rather than upon the "almost universal method" of enforc-
ing compliance by taxpayers who are not thus subject to court
control and supervision.
One liability of a penal nature that may be incurred during
administration is the increase in liability for federal unemployment
tax imposed when the related contribution to the state fund is
tardily paid. The federal tax was enacted primarily not as a means
of raising revenue, but rather as a means of encouraging the states
to enact tax-supported unemployment compensation systems.324
The liability for the 3.2 percent federal tax, therefore, may be
abated up to a maximum of 2.7 percent of taxable wages 325 by a
credit for payments by the employer to the state fund. If the
employer's payment of the state tax is delayed beyond the due date
of the federal return, for whatever reason, the credit for state tax
payments ultimately made is reduced to ninety percent of the
amount otherwise allowable-i.e., to a maximum of 2.43
percent326-thus increasing the net federal liability from 0.5 per-
cent to 0.77 percent. This fifty-four percent increase for late
payment is as penal in effect as any delinquency penalty. 327 It is
sheer euphemism to say, as some bankruptcy courts have, that the
denial of the credit is not a penalty imposed for late payment but
reflects the failure of the taxpayer to qualify for a reward in the
form of a tax reduction which was tendered in order to encourage
timely payment.328
Although the Supreme Court has agreed that the additional
federal tax resulting from denial of the credit was not a penalty
disallowable in bankruptcy, the case before it was not one involving
merely a delayed payment, but one in which the state tax for which
credit was denied could not be paid at all.329 Congress may have
324 See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585-90 (1937).
325 Originally the federal tax was 3% and the maximum credit was 90% thereof. The
basic federal rate is now 3.2% (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3301), but the maximum credit is
frozen at 90% of 3%. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3302(c)(1) & (d)(1). The remaining 0.5% is
used for the federal government's expenses of administration of the system, for assistance to
the states in their administrative costs, and for advances to the states to meet unusual needs
for unemployment benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1101-05, 1321 (1970).
326 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3302(a)(3).
327 Cf. New York v. Jersawit, 263 U.S. 493, 496 (1924).
328 In re Illinois Art Indus., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 334, 335 (W.D. Mich. 1939); In re
Richmaid Creameries, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 828, 829 (S.D. Cal. 1937), rev'd on stip. sub nom.
Boteler v. Rogan, 97 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1938). Contra, In re Hy-Grade Meat & Grocery Co.,
26 F. Supp. 294, 295 (D.N.J. 1938); In re Standard Composition Co., 23 F. Supp. 391, 395
(E.D. Mich. 1938). See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R. Fed. 657, 670 (1969).
329 United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1942). For the monstrous
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had this type of case in mind when, in 1939, it sought to "set at rest
the question involved by expressly providing that no part" of the
federal unemployment tax shall be deemed a penalty for purposes
of the Bankruptcy Act. 330 It provided in the same legislation that
no loss or reduction of credit should occur merely because of
lateness of payment if the
taxpayer's assets, at any time during the period from [the] last
day for filing a return for such year to June 30 next following
such last day, both dates inclusive, are in the custody or control
of a receiver, trustee, or other fiduciary appointed by, or under
the control of, a court of competent jurisdiction. 33'
Congress, however, eliminated that relief provision in 1943, declar-
ing that it "does not appear to be warranted" in view of a further
amendment then made which provided that the credit was no
longer wholly forfeited for late payment and that ninety percent of
it could be earned by payment at any time.332 But it is doubtful that
a relatively small penalty for a delay that is "necessitated by law if
the courts are properly to preserve and protect the estate for the
benefit of all interests involved"333 is any more warranted than a
large one.
The trustee or debtor in possession may incur this penalty with
respect to unemployment taxes which are (1) payable after the
petition on wages paid prior thereto, (2) payable on wages paid
after the petition but earned prior thereto, or (3) payable on wages
earned during the administration. In any of these cases, the trustee
may risk surcharge if, in order to spare the estate the burden of the
penalty, he makes timely payment and the assets later prove
insufficient to satisfy claims of equal or higher priority.334 The
Commission proposal recognizes the inequity of reducing the
algebraic device by which the federal government, supposedly standing on a parity with the
state under Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4) (11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970)), actually gets not only a
greater proportion of the fund available for unemployment tax but often a greater dollar
amount, the smaller the fund may be, see Plumb, supra note 203, at 72-73. Draft remedial
legislation also is set out, although it is not discussed herein since the Commission has made
no proposal in that regard. Id. at 103-04, 105-07.
33' S. REP. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1939) (describing § 902(i) of the Social
Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1400).
M' Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 609, 53 Stat. 1387.
332 H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. 73 (1943) (referring to § 601 of the
Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, 58 Stat. 21).
333 See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green,-329 U.S. 156, 163 (1946).
... In re Lambertville Rubber Co., III F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1940) (taxes paid on wages
earned and paid both before and after, where funds ultimately proved inadequate for
administration expenses).
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credit in such circumstances and provides that, "[n]otwithstanding
any other law, such taxes on an employer paid by the trustee or
debtor shall be computed without reduction in the amount of any
applicable credit due to late payment."33 5 Unfortunately, an am-
biguity is introduced by the use of the term "such taxes," because
the reference is to a preceding sentence which deals not with
unemployment taxes in general, but with "taxes imposed on an
employer with respect to the payment of compensation for per-
sonal services earned but unpaid prior to the filing of the petition."3 36
Read narrowly, the provision grants relief only in the second of the
three situations referred to above. The provision ought to apply,
and probably was meant to apply, to all three situations since all
involve an increase in taxes occasioned by delay necessitated by the
bankruptcy administration. 2 7 Furthermore, the relief 'ought to be
made applicable is still a fourth situation, where the debtor em-
ployer had already forfeited a portion of the credit by his own tax
delinquency occurring before the administration began; such a
penalty ought to be remitted just as other penalties for the debtor's
past defaults are remitted in favor of the estate when bankruptcy
follows. 338
C. Insolvency Priorities Contrasted
There is another federal statute, applicable generally to insol-
vencies not governed by the Bankruptcy Act, which prescribes that
"the debts due the United States shall be first satisfied. '339 The
335 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(c) (emphasis added).
336 Id. (emphasis added).
a33 On the other hand, the Commission's granting of relief in one or all of these
situations is difficult to reconcile with its unwillingness to relieve the estate of other penalties
incurred during administration on account of delays necessitated thereby. See Boteler v.
Ingels, 308 U.S. 57 (1939); notes 315 & 322 supra.
338 In accordance with the Commission's new approach to penalties (note 301 supra),
the differential in the credit might appropriately be merely subordinated, rather than
forgiven. In that event, the amount of the differential might, consistently with the treatment
of penalties, be made a nondischargeable obligation of the debtor if the tax itself is
nondischargeable (see notes 425-33 infra). On the other hand, because the additional tax is
incurred regardless of fault, for failures occurring on the road toward bankruptcy, such
treatment of the debtor may be unduly harsh.
339 Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or
whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or
administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts
due to the United States shall be first satsified; and the priority hereby established
shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay
all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and
effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law,
as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.
REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
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statute, never substantially amended since 1797,340 "on its. face
permits no exception whatever" to the priority in favor of federal
claims. 341 In proceedings to which the statute applies, all federal
claims, whether arising from taxes,342 penalties, 343 contracts, 344
direct government loans, 345 or defaulted guaranteed loans, 346
enjoy absolute priority over all unsecured claims, including
wages3 4 7 and state and local taxes,3 48 as well as over most antece-
dent liens,349 including mechanics' liens3 50 and possibly even
mortgages. 351 Although the earliest bankruptcy laws incorporated
this absolute federal priority, 352 the Act of 1898 began the process
of downgrading the federal priority in bankruptcy. 35 3 The
Commission's proposals eliminate the last remaining areas in which
the ancient federal insolvency priority statute is applied in bank-
ruptcy proceedings by deleting the present fifth level of priority,
which federal nontax claims now share with certain claims of
340 The law assumed substantially its present form in the Act of March 3, 1797 (ch. 20,
§ 5, 1 Stat. 496, 515), although a provision of more limited application had been enacted by
the first Congress in 1789 (Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 21, 1 Stat. 24, 42).
341 See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 357 (1964).
342 Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492, 501 (1926).
313 Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 93 (1929); Jobbers Credit Ass'n v.
United States, 164 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
344 United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544, 548 (1936).
141 Small Business Admin. v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960); United States v. Remund,
330 U.S. 539 (1947).
346 United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941).-
347 Id. at 426.
341 Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
349 Liens are subordinated to the federal insolvency priority unless they meet a
standard of "choateness" so exacting that no case which has ever come before the Supreme
Court has satisfied it. The Court, therefore, has reserved the question whether even a
"choate" lien could prevail. See United States v. Gilbert Assoc., 345 U.S. 361, 365 (1953). To
be "choate" in this sense, not only must the identity of the lienor, the amount of the lien, and
the property subject to the lien be fixed beyond possibility of change or dispute (Illinois ex
rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370-76 (1946)), but, at least in the case of personalty,
the debtor must have been divested of either title or possession, if not both. United States v.
Gilbert Assoc., supra at 366.
350 H.B. Agsten & Sons, Inc. v, Huntington Trust & Sav. Bank, 388 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968); cf. W.T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realiy Co., 318 F.2d
881 (4th Cir. 1963).
3-1 The Supreme Court pointedly left this-question open. See New York v. Maclay, 288
U.S. 290, 294 (1933). But lower courts have consistently recognized prior mortgages in
insolvency. Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 246 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 868 (1957); United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir.
1929), aff'd on other grounds, 280 U.S. 478 (1930); Evans v. Stewart, 245 Iowa 1268, 66
N.W.2d 442 (1954).
52 See note 102 supra.
353 See notes 106-39 and accompanying text supra.
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landlords,354 and by making the bankruptcy system of priorities
controlling for the first time in railroad and corporate
reorganizations.15 5
The federal insolvency priority statute, however, continues to
be applicable in cases of general assignments for the benefit of
creditors356 and in equity receiverships, 357 and possibly in cases in
which an act of bankruptcy is committed but neither bankruptcy
nor any other collective proceeding actually follows. 358 The Com-
mission proposal discards the statutory term "act of bankruptcy" in
the Bankruptcy Act, which may force the courts in insolvency cases
to reapply the general concepts of such acts, which they had
applied during most of the first century under the insolvency
priority statute.359 The Commission's proposed substitute, how-
ever, making the debtor's general failure or inability "to pay his
current liabilities as they become due" the "basis for relief" in a
creditor's petition for bankruptcy, 360 might be construed as making
'5' Compare Bankruptcy Act § 64a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (1970), with PROPOSED
BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a), which has no comparable provision.
'5 See notes 271-75 and accompanying text supra.
356 See, e.g., United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
"-7 See, e.g., Illinois ex reL Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 368-69 (1946).
5' The Supreme Court repeatedly has generalized in dicta that the insolvency priority
was intended to apply only "when the possession and control of the estate of the insolvent is
given to any person charged with the duty of applying it to the payment of the debts of the
insolvent, as the rights and priorities of creditors may be made to appear." Bramwell v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 490 (1926). See also King v. United States, 379
U.S. 329, 336 (1964); United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544, 552 (1936); United States v.
Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 260 (1923). Nevertheless, lower courts, taking literally the statutory
language (see note 339 supra) making the priority applicable in "cases in which an act of
bankruptcy is committed," have enforced it where there has been a preferential transfer,
whether or not within four months. Lakeshore Apts. Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 349, 353
(9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Caldwell, 74 F. Supp. 114 (M.D. Tenn. 1947). Priority has
also been applied where there was a fraudulent conveyance. United States v. Mr. Hamburg
Bronx Corp., 228 F. Supp. 115, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Furthermore, insolvency priority
has attached where a creditor secured a lien by legal proceedings not duly vacated or
discharged. W.T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1963));
see Bankruptcy Act § 3a, 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970) (defining acts of bankruptcy). The courts
have generally interpreted the term "act of bankruptcy" in the insolvency statute by
reference to the changing meanings thereof in the Bankruptcy Act. Illinois exreL Gordon v.
Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 368 (1946); United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 262 (1923).
The Commission's proposal to abandon, in bankruptcy, the concept of an "act of bank-
ruptcy" (see PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-205 Note 5) may preclude the foregoing events
from acting as triggers for the insolvency priority.
359 There was no federal bankruptcy law when the insolvency priority statute was
enacted, or during much of the nineteenth century, but the courts were able to identify acts
of bankruptcy for this purpose. See Prince v. Bartlett, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 431, 433 (1874).
360 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 4-205(c)(1), (2); see BANKRUPTCY COM'N REPORT
187-91.
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the existence of that condition the equivalent of an act of bank-
ruptcy for the purpose of invoking the insolvency statute when
bankruptcy does not follow, thus in effect removing one of the
conditions precedent and giving the statute a potential breadth of
application that it never had before.36 '
In most such cases, creditors may be able to protect themselves
by petitioning for a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, but that
choice is not always available. 362 No such option exists, or will exist
under the Commission's 'proposals, if the debtor is already
deceased 36 3 or is a state bank,364 a savings and loan association,
365
an insurance company,366 or a farmer.367 The bankruptcy option is
also unavailable under present law if the debtor owes less than
$1,000,368 of which an aggregate of $500 is owed to petitioning
creditors, or if less than three of a total of twelve or more creditors
361 For the insolvency statute to apply, there must not only be an act of bankruptcy
-which, if the above test is applied, would be present whenever there is insolvency in the
"equity" sense-but the debtor must also be insolvent in the "bankruptcy" sense of an excess
of liabilities over assets. United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253 (1923). But, despite some
opinion to the contrary, insolvency in the latter sense arising at any time before distribution
will make the insolvency priority apply. Compare Comm. on Relative Priority of Government
and Private Liens, Report, 4 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUSTJ. 413, 419-20 (1969), with Plumb,
supra note 203, at 21-31.
362 See Krauth v. Mid-Ohio Indus., Inc., 72-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9512 (Ohio App. 1972)
(inability of wage-earners to convert receivership into bankruptcy cost them priority over
federal claims).
363 See In re Fackelman, 248 F. 565, 568 (S.D. Cal. 1918). The insolvency priority statute
applies to decedents' estates. Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1956); In re
Shoptaw's Estate, 54 Wash. 2d 602, 343 P.2d 740 (1959). The Commission considered, but
rejected, extension of bankruptcy administration to insolvent decedents' estates.
BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT 184-85. But that should not preclude making applicable a
uniform system of priorities among creditors whether the debtor is alive or dead. Plumb,
supra note 203, at 60-61.
364 A bank cannot become bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act § 4, 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1970);
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 4-201, -204. The insolvency priority statute applies to bank
liquidations. Bramwell v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1926). It is,
however, made inapplicable to national banks. Cook County Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107
U.S. 445 (1883); 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1970).
365 Bankruptcy Act § 4, 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1970); PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 4-201,
-204.
366 An insurance company cannot become bankrupt, but the insolvency statute applies
to it. United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936); Bankruptcy Act § 4, 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1970);
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 4-201, -204.
367 Involuntary bankruptcy proceedings may not be brought against a farmer. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 4b, I I U.S.C. § 22(b) (1970); PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-204. "Wage
earners" working for less than $1,500 a year are now also excluded. Bankruptcy Act
§§ 1(32), 4b, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(32), 22(b) (1970). But the Commission proposal drops
that exclusion. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-204 Note.
368 Bankruptcy Act § 4b, 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1970).
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are willing to join.369 In place of these requirements, the Commis-
sion substitutes a single standard: the petitioning creditors must
hold in the aggregate at least $2,500 of noncontingent claims in
excess of their security. 370 Even when bankruptcy is a legally
available alternative, it may involve greater costs of administration
than a simple assignment for the benefit of creditors, 371 and in a
small estate these costs may nullify the priority advantage.
The American Bar Association has proposed legislation de-
signed to bring the federal insolvency priority statute into the
twentieth century and generally to conform it to the lien priority
and bankruptcy laws as they now exist. 372 The bill is not without its
faults,373 and it will obviously need a major overhaul to bring it into
alignment with the Commission's bankruptcy proposals. The
Commission's proposals accentuate the disparities between the
outmoded priority rules in nonbankruptcy insolvencies and those
under the Bankruptcy Act. The reform of the archaic insolvency
priority should be effected, if not by amendment of the
Commission's own bill, at least by coordinated action before in-
terest in the whole subject is allowed to cool. 374
II
DISCHARGE OF TAX OBLIGATIONS
the Commission proposes that taxes which are denied priority
under the one-year rule described above shall be dischargeable in
369 Id. § 59b, 11 U.S.C. § 95(b) (1970).
370 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-205(a). For a proceeding under proposed Chapter
VII, the successor to present Chapters X, XI, and XII, the petitioning creditors would have
to hold $10,000 of noncontingent claims.'Id. § 4-205(b). Like other dollar amounts specified
in the proposed Act (see note 204 and accompanying text supra), these minimum require-
ments would automatically be adjusted periodically to reflect changes in the cost of living
index. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 1-105.
M See BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT 64-65. It is the hope of the Commission that its
proposals will achieve a substantial reduction of expenses in bankruptcy. Id. at 214.
372 The A.B.A. proposal is set out in Comm. on Relative Priority of Government and
Private Liens, supra note 361, and was, with minor changes, introduced "by request" in the
92d Congress by Senator Quentin Burdick for the purpose of inviting public comment. S.
2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
373 For a critical but friendly analysis and a proposed revision, see Plumb, supra note
203.
374 The adverse effects of the insolvency priority rule on wage earners, business
creditors, and state and local governments, respectively, are described by the writer in three
other articles. Plumb, The Relative Priority of Federal and Business Claims: Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow, 27 Bus. LAWYER 1195 (1972); The Relative Priority vfClaims of Workingmen and vfthe
Federal Government in Insolvency, 23 LAB. J. 259 (1972); The Priorities of Federal Taxes over
State and Local Taxes-Revisited, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 133 (1972).
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bankruptcy unless a tax return, if required, is not filed more than
one year before the date of the petition, or if filed is false or
fraudulent. 375 Penalties and postbankruptcy interest are discharge-
able if the underlying tax liability is discharged.
376
A. Current Law
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is not solely to collect and
marshal the debtors' assets for the benefit of creditors. It is also to
relieve the honest but unfortunate debtor of burdensome debts so
he can make a fresh start.3 77 Until 1966, however, Congress's
competing concern for the collection of the taxes upon which
government depends for its support caused it to make all tax
liabilities nondischargeable. 378 Although the House version of the
Chandler Act would have made taxes dischargeable like other
debts, the Senate, at the instance of the Treasury Department,
restored total nondischargeability on the ground that "if federal
taxes were made dischargeable, it would open the door to
evasion. '379 Thereafter, at least as early as 1946, the American Bar
Association and the bankruptcy bar began a prolonged drive to
make dischargeable all tax claims except those that had accrued
within one year before bankruptcy.38 0 The discharge proposal,
extensively modified in an effort to accommodate Treasury objec-
tions, was finally enacted in 1966, when Congress concluded, upon
rebalancing the equities of the debtors and the needs of govern-
ment, that "the enormous increase in the tax burden during recent
years and the consequent impact on both the distribution of a
75 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-506(a)(1).
376 Id. § 4-506 Notes 4 & 18-20.
377 Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244-45 (1934); Shelby v. Texas Improvement Loan Co., 280 F.2d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 1960);
see S. REP. No. 1158, supra note 128, at 2; BANKRUPTCY COMIMI'N REPORT 62-65.
378 Act ofJuly 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 17a(1), 30 Stat. 550, as amended, Act of June 22, 1938,
ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 851. Although the nineteenth century bankruptcy laws, other than the
Act of'April 4, 1800 (ch. 19, § 62, 2 Stat. 36), had failed expressly to except federal claims
froln discharge, the intervening acts were construed not to discharge such claims, on the
theory that the sovereign is not affected unless named. United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 251 (1874). When the 1898 Act expressly excepted taxes from discharge, however, it
was concluded that the omission to refer to other federal claims as well indicated an intent
that such other claims be dischargeable. McPhee v. United States, 64 Colo. 421, 174 P. 808,
812-13 (1918); cf. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152,
159-60 (1912). In the case of state and local taxes, § 17 of the 1898 Act preserved from
discharge only taxes imposed by the jurisdictions within which the debtor resided, but § 1 of
the Chandler Act of 1938 extended the immunity from discharge to those of "any State,
county, district or municipality." (Emphasis added.)
379 83 CONG. REC. 9106 (1938) (explanation by Rep. Chandler).
380 See Olive, supra note 90, at 8-9; Moore & Tone, supra note 90, at 701-05.
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bankrupt's estate and his financial rehabilitation, require a
modification of that status."38'
The 1966 amendment, still in effect, provides for discharge of
the tax liabilities, federal, state, or local, which are denied priority
and ranked with general creditors' claims by its related provisions
heretofore described 382-i.e., tax liabilities which become "legally
due and owing" more than three years before bankruptcy. Excep-
tions are provided for instances of fraud or nonfiling of returns,
for taxes withheld or collected, and for taxes the assessment of
which was restrained pending exhaustion of remedies for review.
The law contains two provisos. The first specifies that the discharge
of a tax liability shall not bar any remedies available under applica-
ble law against property set apart to the bankrupt as exempt.
Therefore, the niggardly exemptions provided by the Internal
Revenue Code3 83 are exclusively applicable 384  to federal tax
liabilities even in bankruptcy. 38 5 The second proviso, that a dis-
charge "shall not release or discharge any tax lien," has resulted in
much litigation. The Government construed it to mean that, since
the general federal tax lien 386 by its nature attaches to after-
acquired property, 38 7 the "discharged" tax liability continued to be
collectible by enforcement of the lien against property the bank-
rupt might thereafter acquire-a position the courts have quite
properly rejected.388
The present tax discharge provision, apart from its am-
38 S. REP. No. 1158,supra note 128, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 687, supra note 128, at 2. The
enactment took the form of Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-496, 80 Stat. 270, amending
Bankruptcy Act § 17a(l), II U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1964) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1970)).
382 See notes 125-33 and accompanying text supra.
883 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6334(a).
384 Id. § 6334(c): "Notwithsta'nding any other law of the United States, no property or
rights to property shall be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made
exempt by subsection (a)."
385 United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (1947).
386 See notes 54-63 and accompanying text supra.
387 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
388 United States v. Sanabria, 424 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir. 1970); In re Biaund, 423 F.2d 718
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 (1970). Although Congress's choice to legislate on tax
priorities (Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970)) by cross reference, to the
discharge section (Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1970)) caused the
lien-preservation proviso to be incorporated into the provision dealing with discharge, it
seems clear that the proviso was not germane to discharge at all but was designed to assure,
by cross-reference, that the loss of priority of dischargeable taxes should not affect their
collectibility from property of the estate ahead of unsecured claims, to the extent that liens
on such property had arisen and were valid in bankruptcy and not postponed. See Marsh,
supra note 39, at 710-12; Plumb, supra note 125, at 270-71.
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biguities of draftsmanship, 38 9 is subject to substantive criticism both
for continuing the inequity to creditors in certain situations, and
for unnecessarily opening the door to evasion by debtors. The in-
equities result from tying the conditions under which a discharge is
permitted to those under which priority will be denied. The
apparent policy reason for this connection is that the denial of
priority for a nondischargeable tax may enhance the amount of the
tax claim that is uncollectible from the estate and thus unduly
enlarge the burden left overhanging the debtor.390 In other re-
spects, however, the policy considerations are not the same. Al-
though a taxpayer should not reap a benefit, through discharge,
from a delay in assessment that occurred for his own accommoda-
tion, the present denial of discharge in such circumstances may be
accompanied by preservation of the priority of taxes accumulated
over an excessive number of years, to the detriment of creditors
who have no knowledge of the accumulation and no responsibility
for the delay. Further, if a taxpayer fails to file a return, files a false
or fraudulent return, or otherwise willfully attempts to evade or
defeat a tax, there is justice in denying him a discharge, but gross
inequity in penalizing his innocent creditors by subjecting them to
the priority of an unlimited accumulation of such tax liabilities.391
The evasion possibilities created by the 1966 amendments are
underscored in a recent report by the Comptroller General to the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation.392 The Comptrol-
ler General urged amendment of the Bankruptcy Act to measure
the three-year period for determining dischargeability from the
date qf assessment, instead of the due date of the return, because
[t]axpayers with high incomes have avoided paying taxes by
taking advantage of the Bankruptcy Act .... Further, because of
delays inherent in auditing returns, in assessing deficiencies, and
in going through legal processes, IRS in all cases is not permitted
sufficient time to collect the taxes before they are discharged
through bankruptcy. Although the number of cases does not
appear to be large, the dollar amounts in the individual cases are
material.393
The Comptroller General also noted that, because collection efforts
389 See notes 126-31 and accompanying text supra.
390 See notes 239-40 and accompanying text supra.
391 See Plumb, supra note 125, at 268-69.
392 COMp. GEN., REPORT TO JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, COLLECTION
OF TAXPAYERS' DELINQUENT ACCOUNTS BY THE IRS (Aug. 9, 1973) (Dep't of Treas.
B-137762).
393 Id. at 25.
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are not instituted until a tax is assessed, the IRS frequently has less
than. three years in which to collect a tax before it becomes
dischargeable. Moreover, the taxpayer, by exercising his various
rights of appeal and by making settlement offers, can easily delay
collection beyond the applicable three-year period and, having
dissipated the earnings on which he failed to pay tax, can be
adjudicated bankrupt and free his future earning power from the
obligation. 394 The Comptroller General concluded:
It is difficult for IRS personnel to decide how aggressively to
pursue collection efforts against delinquent taxpayers whose
financial condition makes them eligible to have their debts dis-
charged through bankruptcy. If they forgo enforcing collection
'94 An instance was cited in which a physician filed delinquent returns for 1953 through
1965, on which tax was assessed in November 1966. Pending consideration of an offer in
compromise, the revenue officers suspended collection efforts, with the result that more
than one year elapsed following the assessment. The physician, who had meanwhile earned,
and apparently spent, $131,000 in 1966 and 1967, then withdrew the offer in compromise,
went bankrupt, and thus freed his future substantial earning jower of the liability. Another
instance was cited in which an entertainer, earning $15,000 a week from performances at a
hotel, contested in the Tax Court federal tax liabilities aggregating to $277,797. All of his
liabilities were more than three years old when the taxpayer agreed to the deficiencies,
thereby terminating the restriction on assessment that would have prevented discharge if he
had gone bankrupt while the Tax Court case was pending, and filed a bankruptcy petition
three days later, before the Service had had any real opportunity to collect the dischargeable
tax. Id. at 26-28.
The facts stated by the Comptroller General have been simplified for clarity. It is recited
that, in the actual case on the latter facts, another creditor had contested the taxpayer's right
to a discharge on unspecified grounds under Bankruptcy Act § 14c (11 U.S.C. § 32(c)
(1970)), and that the question whether he might make good his escape from his liabilities was
still undetermined. CoriP. GEN., REPORT, supra note 392, at 28.
When there is a failure to file a return, if an assessment nevertheless is made, as in the
case of the physician, supra, the time within which a tax remains nondischargeable is three
years from the due date or one year from the assessment, whichever is longer. Bankruptcy
Act § 17a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1970). On facts comparable to those of the physician, a
taxpayer's effort to escape was frustrated because he misjudged the date of the assessment
and filed a petition three days before the year expired. In re O'Leary, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9287 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
With respect to the entertainer's case, Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1)(c) (11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1)(c)
(1970)) excepts from discharge any taxes, regardless of age, "which were not reported on a
return made by the bankrupt and which were not assessed prior to bankruptcy by reason of
a prohibition on assessment pending the exhaustion of administrative or judicial remedies
available to the bankrupt." This precludes discharge of deficiencies not yet finally deter-
mined at the date of bankruptcy, whether resulting from omission of income or improper
deductions. In re Michaud, 458 F.2d 953 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972); In re
Indian Lake Estates, 428 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970). But no grace
period at all is allowed following the expiration of the restriction on assessment resulting
from pendency of a Tax Court contest, so that the tax then immediately becomes discharge-
able if the basic three-year period has expired. See Plumb, supra note 125, at 267. The
Treasury anticipated this eventuality in a letter to the House Judiciary Committee, set out in
HOUSE REPORT 6.
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in hopes that the taxpayer's financial condition may improve in
the future, they risk allowing the taxes to become more than 3
years old and subject to discharge through bankruptcy. How-
ever, if they take collection action immediately, they may cause
undue hardship or precipitate the taxpayer's bankruptcy.3 95
B. The Commission's Proposals
Rather than undertaking to rectify the defects in the com-
promise legislation of 1966,396 the Commission has thrown down
the gage to the Treasury Department-and by implication to the
Comptroller General and the Senate Finance Committee, who have
supported the Treasury position 39 7-- by resurrecting the substance
of the original, far-reaching American Bar Association recommen-
dation. All taxes other than those withheld by the debtor from
wage payments and those for which he failed to file a required
return or filed a false or fraudulent return, or which he otherwise
willfully attempted to evade or defeat, are dischargeable if the
petition is filed mor6 than one year from the later of
(1) the date when a return is actually filed, if a return for
such tax is required by law;39 8
(2) whichever of the following is applicable:
(a) the due date or extended due date of the return, in
the case of taxes upon or measured by income, as well as
employment taxes;
(b) the last date on which payment might be made
without penalty, in the case of ad valorem taxes; or
(c) the date of the taxable transaction, in the case of
customs duties and excise taxes.399
If a three-year limitation poses problems for the tax collector
under existing law, the proposed one-year cutoff presents obvious
impossibilities. With nearly three million delinquent federal tax
accounts to dispose of each year involving-over three and a half
billion dollars, 40 0 there will necessarily be many in which the
collection officers will be unable to complete in time the process of
39- COMP. GEN., REPORT, supra note 392, at 28.
396 For a draft of amendments designed to overcome the deficiencies in the 1966 Act
without departing from its essential purpose, see Plumb, supra note 232, at 45-46.
397 S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); COMP. GEN., REPORT, supra note 392.
398 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-506(a)(1)(B).
399 Id. § 4-506(a)(1)(A). This provision incorporates by reference the priority rules of
Proposed § 4-405(a)(5). Notes 227-62 and accompanying text supra. Whereas present law sets
out the rules in the discharge provision (Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1)
(1970)) and adopts them by cross-reference in the priority provision (Id. § 64a(4), 11 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(4) (1970)), the proposed statute reverses that procedure.
400 COMM'R OF INT. REV. ANN. REP. 25 (FY 1971).
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discovering the delinquency, attempting to obtain voluntary pay-
ment, considering compromise offers, and locating and levying on
assets.40 ' The Commission, anticipating the criticism that the short
cut-off period will preclude IRS leniency which might facilitate the
debtor's recovery without bankruptcy, adds a provision that, if an
extension of time for payment is granted, apparently either before
or after the initial one-year period expires, dischargeability is
limited to the unpaid installments that become payable under the
extension agreement more than one year prior to the filing of the
petition. 40 2 This provision, however, affords no protection for the
Treasury where the tax collector, in continuing beyond the initial
year to seek assets from which to collect, is unable to extract an
installment payment agreement from the debtor or is unwilling to
tie his own hands by agreeing to an extension of time for payment.
The provision likewise fails to protect the Government in the case,
now proposed for the first time to be made subject to one-year
dischargeability, where the debtor's liability does not appear on the
face of the return because the taxpayer has nonfraudulently re-
solved in his favor any doubtful issues of income and deductions
and the conflict cannot be settled within the applicable one-year
period.40 3
The provision for nondischargeability of taxes which the
debtor has "willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat"
may possibly serve, in extreme situations, to frustrate taxpayers
who file honest returns and then stall the collection process to
escape the admitted liability by filing in bankruptcy a year and a
day after the return is filed. In criminal cases, our Dickensian
aversion to imprisonment for debt makes it all but impossible to
convict a high-living taxpayer who duly discloses but does not pay
his tax liability, even for the offense of "willfully fail[ing] to pay, 404
let alone for the more aggravated offense of "willfully attempt[ing]
401 Although cases closed in 1971 approximately matched new cases opened, the
carryover at the end of the fiscal year was 759,000 cases involving $1,899,804,000 in taxes.
The periods for which they had been outstanding are not indicated in the report. Id.
402 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcT § 4-506(a)(1)(A), incorporating id. § 4-405(a)(5)(F). The
latter section similarly denies priority only to the part of the claim the deferred payments on
which have been delinquent to that extent. For a discussion of the resulting exposure of
creditors to an accumulation of unknown noncurrent tax claims, see notes 243-48 and
accompanying text supra.
403 The present law is set out in note 394 supra.
404 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7203; see United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir.
1958). A conviction was sustained in United States v. Andros, 484 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1973),
on evidence that the taxpayer had sufficient funds, which he deposited under a fictitious
name.
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in any manner to evade or defeat" the tax.40 5 Nevertheless, the
added element of affirmative acts calculated to cause collection to
be deferred until the liability becomes dischargeable may supply
the essential evidence of "attempt . . . to evade or defeat,240 6
particularly since the words may be construed more broadly when
only civil sanctions, in this instance the denial of a discharge, are
invoked.4 °7 Nevertheless, it probably is better to deal with the
problem directly. In analogous circumstances, the Commission
proposes to deny discharge of private debts voluntarily incurred,
without the intention to repay, 40 8 in a spending spree in anticipa-
tion of bankruptcy. It seems appropriate to make comparable
express provision denying or conditioning discharge when the
debtor, in anticipation of bankruptcy, has affirmatively contributed
to delay in collection of his taxes.
In situations where the delay in collection is caused by the
debtor's fraud or delinquency in the return itself, the Commission
retains in substance the present nondischargeability provision,40 9
although it relieves other creditors of the effect of priority of taxes
even in such cases-if the claims are over one year old. 41 0 The
Commission justifiably departs from the policy pursued in tht 1966
legislation of completely coordinating the priority and discharge
rules.411 The proposal reflects an effort to balance the interests of
the Government, when it lacks a proper return on which to base
timely action against the erring taxpayer, and the creditors who
arguably should not bear a greater accumulation of superior claims
merely by reason of the debtor's delinquency or wrongdoing. In
this respect, the proposal is consistent with the long-standing policy
of the bankruptcy law denying discharge of certain debts with
respect to which the debtor has been guilty of wrongdoing or
405 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7201. To constitute the felony of willfully attempting to
evade a tax, there must be in addition to willful nonpayment some affirmative actions
directed toward escaping the tax. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496-500 (1943).
406 The purpose in this instance is assumed to be not merely postponement of payment,
but its ultimate escape, which constitutes evasion. See Edwards v. United States, 375 F.2d
862, 866-67 (9th Cir. 1967).
407 See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933); Monday v. United States,
421 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
408 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-506(a)(3); see BANKRUPTCY COM,'N REPORT 176.
409 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 4-506(a)(1)(B), (C). In denying discharge in the case
of nonfraudulent failure to file a return, the proposal is more stringent than present law,
which allows discharge if the tax liability, despite such failure, has been discovered and
assessed more than a year before bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act §§ 17a(1)(a), (b), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 35(a)(1)(a), (b) (1970).
410 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-405(a)(5).
411 See notes 239-40, 390 and accompanying text supra.
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nondisclosure, although the claims enjoy no corresponding
priority.412
Departure from the policy of coordination may, however, be
unduly harsh to the debtor who merely fails to file on time because
of some reasonable excuse, such as illness, absence from the
country, casualty, or reliance on expert advice that a return was not
required, 413 or who files a timely return but inadvertently fails to
sign it.41 4 Even more insupportable is the fact that, at least in excise
tax cases, nondischargeability may be accompanied by loss of
priority, with consequent increase in the burden on the debtor's
later assets and earnings, in some instances in which the return was
not delinquent at all, as a result of the proposal to start the
one-year period for loss of priority at the date of the taxable
transaction and the one-year period for dischargeability at the date
the return is filed.415
The two controversial provisos in the present discharge provi-
sion, preserving the taxing authority's rights in exempt property
and in property subject to lien, i n are eliminated by the Commis-
sion: it recommends that tax claims no longer be collectible from
the exempt property of a discharged bankrupt417 and that statu-
tory liens no longer be generally recognized against the bankrupt
estate.418
412 Bankruptcy Act §§ 17a(2), (3), (4), (8), II U.S.C. §§ 35(a)(2), (3), (4), (8) (1970). The
proposal also is consistent with the policy of relieving the bankrupt estate, and hence the
creditors, of monetary penalties for the debtor's prebankruptcy fraud or delinquency
(Bankruptcy Act § 57j, I I U.S.C. § 930) (1970); see notes 292-98 and accompanying text
supra), while leaving the debtor undischarged therefrom (Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1)(d), II
U.S.C. § 35(a)(1)(d) (1970); see notes 421-26 and accompanying text infra). See Plumb, supra
note 125, at 268-69.
413 Unlike the provision imposing a penalty for failure to file a return (INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 6651(a)), the proposal denies discharge irrespective of whether the nonfiling or
late filing is excused by reasonable cause. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcT § 4-506(a)(1)(B).
414 An unsigned or otherwise incomplete return is considered no return at all. Vaira v.
Commissioner, 444 F.2d 770, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1971); Plunkett v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d
644, 649-50 (1st Cir. 1941).
415 For example, if a transaction subject to excise tax occurs on December 14, 1974, a
return is timely filed on February 28, 1975, and bankruptcy occurs on February 1, 1976, the
tax claim will be denied priority (PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcT § 4-405(a)(5)(E)), but the
unsatisfied claim will be nondischargeable. PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-506(a)(1)(B); see
notes 255 and accompanying text supra.
416 See notes 383-88 and accompanying text supra.
417 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcT § 4-503(a); id. Note 2.
418 See notes 80-101 and accompanying text supra. Although statutory liens for ad
valorem taxes and special assessments would continue to be recognized against property of
the estate (PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcT §§ 4-606(a)(2), (3)), there is no occasion to refer to
such liens in the proposed discharge provision, which would no longer serve, by cross-
reference, to set priorities in the estate. See note 399 supra.
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Like present law, the proposal is silent concerning the dis-
chargeability of postpetition interest on tax claims. 4 19 The Commis-
sion states that it does not intend to disturb the existing judicial
rule that the liability for such interest survives if the tax itself is not
discharged. 42 0
The present law is also silent on the dischargeability of
liabilities for tax penalties. Only "provable debts" are
discharged; 421 but the law, although making certain penalties
nonallowable, except to the extent of the pecuniary loss sustained by
the wrongful act,422 does not expressly state that they are not
provable. Courts generally take the position, however, that such
penalties survive a discharge in bankruptcy.423 These holdings are
sometimes predicated upon the questionable theory that the penal-
ties are in effect nonprovable. 424 A better justification, however, is
that the penalties, at least under federal law, are "assessed and
collected in the same manner as taxes" and are treated in all
respects as taxes.425 The latter theory preserves the penalty from
discharge only if the underlying tax liability is itself non-
dischargeable. 426
419 For a discussion of the allowability of such interest and its subordination to general
claims against property of the estate, see notes 277-86 and accompanying text supra.
420 PROPOSED BANKRUPTcY ACT § 4-506 Note 4; see note 280 and accompanying text
supra.
421 Bankruptcy Act § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
422 Id. § 57j, 11 U.S.C. § 930) (1970).
423 World Scope Publishers, Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965). Contra,
United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959).
424 Custom Wood Prods. Inc. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 337 (W.D. Mich. 1971); In
re Steckler, 195 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Ind. 1961); qf. In re Abramson, 210 F. 878 (2d Cir. 1914).
425 Sherwood v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 247, 250-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (relying on
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6671); accord, westenberg v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 915, 917
(D. Ariz. 1968); Lynn v. Scanlon, 234 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). The cases involved a
penalty on a corporate officer for not paying over withheld taxes (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6672), a "pecuniary loss" penalty which was dearly provable and allowable, and hence
dischargeable (Bankruptcy Act § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1970)) unless excepted as a tax.
Similar language assimilating nonpecuniary loss penalties for fraud and delinquency into the
taxes to which they relate is found in § 6659 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Although United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1959), rejected a
similar argument with respect to income tax penalties, the most comparable language of the
1939 Internal Revenue Code (§§ 291, 293) was not considered by the court, and the case has
in any event been discredited by its being overruled on the closely related question of
dischargeability of postbankruptcy interest. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964);
cf. Jeanne Hamar, 42 T.C. 867, 878-79 (1964).
426 The IRS has announced that it will not claim penalties against after-acquired
property of the debtor unless the taxes to which the penalties relate are themselves
nondischargeable. Rev. Rul. 68-574, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 595, 597. A proposal by the
Treasury and the Senate Finance Committee expressly to inject this decision into the 1966
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act was not adopted. See Plumb, supra note 125, at 272.
1058
TAX RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commission states its intention to "clarify and rationalize"
the dischargeability status of penalties.427 It abandons the concept
of "provability," and makes all claims, whether allowable or not,
dischargeable unless excepted. 42 8 Fines imposed for the benefit of a
federal, state, or local government are expressly excepted from
discharge.429 Civil penalties are not mentioned and therefore are
dischargeable, even though subordinated in the estate to virtually
all other claims,43 0 unless embraced in some other specific category
of excepted claims.43' The Commission states its intention that
"prepetition" tax penalties, presumably those incurred before the
proceeding, whenever determined, are dischargeable "if and to the.
extent that the tax debt... giv[ing] rise to the penalty is discharge-
able," but that if the tax debt is itself nondischargeable--e.g.,
because the debtor filed a fraudulent return or no return at all, the
penalty too is nondischargeable. 432 The Commission's note adds a
cryptic statement that a "postpetition penalty is a nondischargeable
liability of the debtor only if the tax liability from which it arises is
nondischargeable, ' 433 although it is difficult to imagine a "postpeti-
tion" liability that would ever be anything but "non-
dischargeable. ' '434
427 See PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AcT § 4-506 Note 18.
428 Id. § 4-506(a); id. Note 19.
429 Id. § 4-506(a)(9).
430 See notes 299-302 and accompanying text supra.
431 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-506 Note 19.
432 Id. Note 20. If that semi-official legislative history is accepted as controlling (see
Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1953); King v. United States,
390 F.2d 894, 913 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Associates Investment Co., 59 T.C. 441,445 (1972)), or if it
is restated in the congressional committee reports, it will give a firmer statutory base to the
rule of the cases discussed in note 425 supra, and will sustain the extension of the rule to
taxes of state and local government which may lack laws expressly assimilating penalties into
the tax liabilities to which they relate.
433 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 4-506 Note 20. Presumably a "postpetition penalty" is
one incurred during the proceeding. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 692-95 (1966).
434 Since only tax liabilities incurred at least a year before the petition will be discharge-
able, it is unlikely that, during the proceeding, the estate would incur any penalties with
respect thereto. In reorganizations and rehabilitative proceedings, taxes becoming payable in
the course thereof attach to the debtor following consummation (Bankruptcy Act §§ 271, 397,
523, 11 U.S.C. §§ 671, 797, 923 (1970); PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 7-315(e)) and are not
discharged. In straight bankruptcies, any tax liabilities and resulting penalties arising during
the proceeding would be those of the estate, not of the debtor, except in the case of
corporate income taxes, regarding which § 6012(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code treats
the corporation as the continuing taxable entity, but regarding which the Commission
proposes in any event (1) to eliminate liability for such income tax in most circumstances
(PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT § 7-315(b)) and (2) to make corporate bankrupts ineligible for
discharge (id. § 4-505; id. Note 3). See Plumb, supra note 171, at 937-38, 988.
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C. An Alternative Suggestion
The 1966 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act was accepted by
the Congress on the basis of assurances from the House- and Senate
Judiciary Committees that the three-year minimum period that
must elapse before any tax becomes dischargeable thereunder
would allow ample time to audit returns and assess and collect
deficiencies and would "serve to discourage recourse to bankruptcy
as a facile device for evading tax obligations. '435 The Commission,
however, makes no attempt to support its assertion that the pro-
posed one-year period will "give the Treasury adequate time to
\ collect taxes. ' 436 The Commission's only stated justification for its
one-year proposal and for its failure to deal adequately with even
the aggravated situations described above is found in its view that
"the amount of revenue [involved in bankruptcy cases] is
insignificant to the federal government. '437
The effect on the revenue might be magnified, however, if, as
has been predicted, a bankruptcy "explosion" should result from
the proposed simplification of procedure and liberalization of
provisions for the debtor's "fresh start. '438 Furthermore, because
the federal tax system is largely dependent upon voluntary self-
assessment, taxpayers' awareness of even relatively isolated situa-
tions in which "smart" taxpayers have found ways to escape paying
their share impairs the willingness of others to cooperate in the
self-assessment process, 439 wholly apart from the perhaps limited
incentive for more taxpayers to avail themselves of this particular
means of avoidance. With this problem in mind, the Senate Fi-
135 S. REP. No. 1158,supra note 128, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 687,supra note 128, at 2-3. See
also 112 CONG. REC. 13,821 (1966).
436 BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT 216.
437 Id. at 216. See also notes 82-95 supra. "[A] taxing authority is ...unlikely to be
affected substantially by the bankruptcy process because only a minute percentage of almost
any population of debtors obtains relief under the Act." BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT 78.
The statements are all addressed to the reduction of the Government's priority standing,
rather than to the question of discharge, but the Commission clearly views the questions as
interdependent.
431 Twinem, Bankruptcy Report: Some Limitations on Creditors' Rights, 29 Bus. LAWYER
353-54 (1974).
9 See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1969) (regarding the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)). Not many taxpayers, for example, hold
public papers they could give away at a tax saving, and the aggregate revenue loss from this
and a number of other charitable deduction loopholes was estimated at a mere five to twenty
million dollars. Id. at 80-81, 95. Yet there can be little doubt that recent revelations
concerning the earlier use of such devices have produced a more cynical taxpayer attitude
toward tax obligations generally, which will not be easily repaired.
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nance Committee vainly urged in 1966 that the more limited
discharge provision then under consideration, which was enacted
over its opposition, be qualified by requiring that a limited percen-
tage of the debtor's future after-tax earnings be charged with his
prebankruptcy tax liabilities.44 0 The Committee declared that
[a] discharge provision which relieves the bankrupt of his tax
liabilities could materially harm taxpayer morale in this country
and thereby adversely affect the self-assessment revenue system.
Of particular concern would be those cases where, shortly after
bankruptcy and discharge, an individual earns large sums of
.income but would be under no responsibility to pay any of his
remaining prebankruptcy tax liabilities. To provide such an
individual with this type of tax forgiveness while most citizens are
paying their fair share of our Nation's revenue needs, is in the
view of this committee, both inequitable and likely to undermine
the morale of our tax eystem. Additionally, in view of the
substantial increase in voluntary bankruptcies which 'has been
occurring in recent years, it does not seem prudent to provide
potential bankrupts with the additional incentive of avoiding
unpaid tax liabilities.441
The Commission itself, in recommending safeguards against abuse
of discharge provisions in the cases of consumer and student
debts,442 states that although "[t]he Commission is not aware of any
evidence that suggests these are significant problems numerically,
. . . such abuses discredit the system and cause disrespect for the
law and those charged with its administration."4 43 At least equal
concern should be shown for preserving whatever may remain of
taxpayer confidence in the working of the tax system.
In order to give greater relief to debtors overburdened by tax
liabilities, without opening the door to complete escape from taxes
which the government will have had inadequate opportunity to
determine and -collect, consideration should be given to an amal-
gam of the discharge provisions of the 1966 legislation, the 1966
counterproposal of the Senate Finance Committee, and the
440 Although giving qualified approval to the principle that after a certain time taxes
should be denied priority over general creditors, the Treasury and the Senate Finance
Committee both opposed the discharge of older taxes, proposing instead to limit the portion
of an individual's subsequent earnings which he would be required to devote to payment of
prebankruptcy taxes had he not been guilty of specified misconduct or omissions. S. REP.
No. 999, supra note 397, at 8-10, 14-16. The proposal was defeated on the Senate floor. 112
CONG. REc. 13, 815-23 (1966).
441 S. REP. No. 999, supra note 397, at 9. See also 112 CONG. REC. 13,816-17 (1966).
442 PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT §j 4-506(a)(3), (8).
413 BANKRUPTCY CONMN REPORT 170.
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Commission's one-year principle. I would not propose to turn back
the clock by undoing the firm determination of Congress in 1966
to discharge, with certain exceptions, those tax liabilities which are
more than three years old at the date of bankruptcy and which the
tax collector has not been restrained from collecting. 444 But for tax
liabilities of intermediate age-i.e., those which would not be dis-
charged under present law but would be discharged under the
Commission's one-year proposal-I suggest, in lieu of discharge, a
system of limited deferred payments, adapted from the Finance
Committee proposal. The debtor would be required to make an-
nual postbankruptcy payments on account of such intermediate-
aged federal taxes in an amount not in excess of ten percent of his
after-tax taxable income for the preceding year,445 and another five
percent would be required to be applied proportionately to
intermediate-aged state and local taxes, unless in either case the
bankruptcy court ordered satisfaction of the obligation at a faster
rate.
4 4 6
CONCLUSION
There is much that is commendable in the Commission's
proposals concerning the priority and discharge of claims. Espe-
cially sound are the proposals for modernizing and making more
flexible the priority of wage claims and the proposed elimination,
in reorganizations as well as in straight bankruptcy, of the priority
for nontax-and generally consensual-federal claims. I submit,
however, that more injury to the revenue than the Commission
444 There are, however, technical deficiencies in the law that should be corrected. See
note 396 supra.
445 The Finance Committee proposal would have reduced the base income to which the
percentage was applied by the amount paid on such back federal taxes and by current
federal income and self-employment taxes. There is no apparent reason why self-
employment taxes should be excluded from base income unless Social Security (FICA)
deductions from the wages of employed persons are also excluded. Reduction of base
income by state income taxes might also be justified, but this raises the question of where to
stop.
446 S. REP. No. 999, supra note 397, at 14-16. As under the Commission's proposal, no
relief would be granted in the case of tax liabilities with respect to which the debtor had filed
a false or fraudulent return or no return at all, or which he had willfully attempted to evade
or defeat, nor would relief be granted with respect to taxes collected or withheld from others
but diverted from payment by the debtor. In addition, the Finance Committee would add a
category of nondeferrable taxes where the debtor had nonfraudulently failed to disclose in
his return gross income exceeding 25% of the amount reported therein. But mere lateness
in filing a return, extending to within one year before bankruptcy, which would cause denial
of a discharge under the Commission's proposal (iee notes 413-14 and accompanying text
supra), would not deprive the debtor of the benefit of deferral.
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imagines may result from its proposals to deny priority for, and to
permit the debtor to obtain a discharge from, tax claims for which
it allows grossly inadequate time for determination and collection. I
therefore urge upon the Congress that serious consideration be
given to the alternative approaches suggested herein.
